This thread will remain the best source with regards to the proposal. However, various adjacent issues/topics have also been raised (e.g. revising the Charter) and these may end up in separate threads.
Apologies for the delay - I will attend to all unanswered comments as soon as possible.
On the issue ANT holders = members, there is a problem to consider, but of course @ronald_k correct me if I am wrong.
I have the feeling that Art. 67 para 1 Swiss CC basically states that the association follows the 1 member 1 vote rule. And the provisions looks mandatory to me. This means that the assembly of members can’t work according to the current token voting system (ie who has more tokens has more voting power).
Therefore giving the power to the tokenholders to cintrol the treasury would probably require the establishement of a different board/organ composed by the tokenholders that rules according to the token voting standard. In any case the assembly of members would always have the final word according to art. 65 Swiss CC.
My understanding is that 1 member 1 vote is the default if the articles don’t specify otherwise, but @ronald_k can confirm. “unless provided otherwise in the statutes of the association, all members have equal voting rights in the general assembly.” - ref
Exactly. The problem is understanding whether the provision is default or mandatory! @ronald_k will tell us!
We could definitely make that happen… it would probably be a Commons Stack led project with support from General Magic on the development side and from the TEC to add more TE expertise… and I would love to support the effort.
The first question would be, how solid is the mission vision and values for this DAO? If we want to change those at all, that’s the first step, otherwise, making sure that those are very well publicized so they are in the forefront of every voter’s mind and can act as guiding principles for how to vote. Without a solid and legitimized MVV to act as a scope for the DAOs activities everything will be harder and parameterizing the DAO will be like moving deck chairs on the Titanic.
This application (now known now as Tao Voting) was built and audited by Aragon, but abandoned at the last minute for a strategic shift, I would still consider this an Aragon product that was just adopted and improved by 1hive. It’s not like Conviction Voting which was very much a 1hive product built on top of the Aragon codebase.
If you want a good understanding of how Tao Voting works, this post on BrightID’s forum can give you a lot of context:
It’s a great application, built by Aragon that fulfills the requirements in the original post.
I think this is a great goal, when the new software is ready, we should move the funds and governance structure to it. That said, I have stepped away from following Aragon for what feels like a few years, (since they stopped trying to decentralize development and broke many agreements in ways that I felt were unacceptable) and even before that there was a slow but steady centralization of governance power and I just lost trust in the org… Love the products that were made 3 years ago, not interested in the current governance structure.
IMO there is no reason to use the new product not being ready as an excuse to slow down this proposal. We can use an older and well-tested Aragon Voting App, fulfill all requirements and still be dog fooding, then when the new product is ready, we can vote to move the funds there.
It might add a little more work in the long run… but it’s worth it. I don’t remember what excuses have justified the centralized governance that Aragon now has, but thats all they are, excuses. There are countless DAOs out there, and many of them use Aragon software! Let’s cut the crap and get this DAO off the ground, the only blockers should be social. It will take time to get the social side going, but the technical side should not slow anything down… not if we authentically want to DAOify Aragon.
I would agree… I don’t think a Swiss legal wrapper is the best option, a corporate entity that has traditional shareholder governance would be better. But honestly I don’t really like legal wrappers for DAOs in general, they end up being very restrictive and causing more issues than they are worth.
Most DAOs have no formal legal entity, the TEC for instance is one, the overhead to have a formal legal entity and a bonding curve would have killed the project so instead they used the Trusted Seed to help protect their members, and that is the real requirement, protect the members, which you can do without creating a restrictive legal wrapper for the DAO itself.
For instance, you can also just make a walk-thru for each member to create their own legal entity (LLC or equiv) to hold their keys if they fear the legal issues that could arise in participating and move on. People can take care of their own keys, they should be able to take care of their own legal liability, esp if you make it easy for them.
The AA already exists and can perform all the needed default world operations. There is less need to bring in more formal legal complications here than there would be for other projects.
Making a complicated legal structure for this new DAO will just be another excuse to slow down the transition, don’t do it, it is a risk but the future benefits are real.
In the words of Immortal Technique:
[People] talk about change and working within the system to achieve that
The problem with always being a conformist is that when you try to change the system from within, it’s not you who changes the system; it’s the system that will eventually change you
There is usually nothing wrong with compromise in a situation, but compromising yourself in a situation is another story completely And I have seen this happen long enough in the few years that I’ve been alive to know that it’s a serious problem
Let’s cut the scope as much as we can to get this through, legal and technical issues can kill projects. We can’t avoid the social requirements, which will slow it down, but we can EASILY avoid the technical and legal issues.
Rather than repeat the Minimum Viable pathway, as taken with the Charter. I suggest we take the time to get this right, upfront.
As we’ve seen with the Charter, minimum viable options that require further clarification create ambiguity which effectively undermines governance. Instead, we can seek to establish unassailable, collective governance legitimacy as opposed to repeating the past.
The ESD have secured funding for Charter adaptation. Agree with @b3n that Charter change requires at the very least
However, as DAO should we not aspire to a cross-discipline, highly coordinated and deeply accountable community to naviagate from current state to optimal and battle-hardened governance that we can safely steward tresasury to, in time. This is why I am here…
Rather than simply accepting, that the criteria proposed here will provide the best outcome (which they may well prove to) - what I counter is that we empower the community to learn and model, debate and investigate and vote on the whole range of parameters that will impact the future of the Aragon Network DAO governance. A collective consensus-building process akin to the TEC Common Upgrade would also ensure the desired result:-
This is imo the optimal path to unassailable, decentralised, governance legitimacy and we already have much of what we need to succeed! Excited
Everything about this conversation resonates with me and IMO we have and great ally here in @GriffGreen and the opportunity to build the DAO from the groundup in partnership with other ecosystem collaborators based on tested and proven process,
@GriffGreen I would love the opportunity to talk with you with the intention to develop a proposal to build community governance from the ground up including TAO voting if this is what ANT holders want to support.
We have the fantastic Aragon manifesto but imo a key part of the decentralisation process should be to raise awareness and facilitate discussion about the MVV for the DAO. I see MVV as something that should seek input from every community member - sure it is a massive undertaking - but worth it for it’s ability to build collective consensus and shared understanding of the DAO’s raison d’etre. Is this the type of learning and experimentation that @Sixto5 might be interested in leading?
Understand this could slow us down a few months
Just to be clear @mlphresearch I 100% support the need to decentralise and will actively participate in any team working towards this goal. Yet in raising this need you’ve seeded a super important conversation and opportunity to build this right from the outset (now) as opposed to rushing through a vote (which would likely succeed) but would not help us build the social aspect of the DAO like a more time consuming but incredibly powerful, ground-up and collective Governance process can. I don’t see these processes as being mutually exclusive but complementary, if we move this proposal to vote I may support it as one means towards decentralisation but I already favour and will actively strive for the social-collective approach.
Sorry to be a bore about this but here’s a link to the Charter I’d like to specifically draw the authors @mlphresearch attention to the requirements for this type of financial proposal as determined by the Aragon Governance Proposal Process S 5 (f)
i. Public deliberation phase: A post with the draft of the proposal is posted in the Aragon
forum for a minimum of 7 days and maximum of 14 days with the format:
- Title of Proposal (in the format “Financial Proposal:[title]”)
- Description of the Action
- Description of why the author believes it will help to increase the number of Active
a. By default, all Financial Proposals involving a deliverable should use an Escrow
(see Additional Definitions). In cases where the use of an Escrow is omitted, a justification must be included in the Description.
b. Greet.me shall be the default Escrow provider for Financial Proposals.
- And suggested optional: ETH Wallet address of the author(s) and/or other identifiers
I’m aware of these requirements but I classified the proposal as beyond merely financial and thus didn’t tag it as such. I also wanted to keep the first draft as short as possible and left most under point 3 implicit. But here’s the gist: it is my impression that, over the years, Aragon has lost a lot of good faith in the broader crypto community and much of it has to do with Aragon’s failure to turn itself into a proper DAO. This has held Aragon back in a variety of ways but, among other things, it has hampered Aragon’s growth and adoption as a leading DAO framework.
@lee0007 - it’s why we are all here. My point is to actually coordinate on it.
100% agree. This is a conversation that has not been engaged in prior to or since the establishment of AN DAO.
Hello, thanks to all participating, there is some really great minds and thus responses to this proposal!
Although in the medium and long-term, as has been discussed often, I believe Aragon should become a DAO, due to the many reasons (offered by the most engaged members of Aragon in the responses) I believe that the sudden urgency to DAOify at the speed in this proposal is unrealistic and creates considerable unnecessary risk from several different angles including legal and governance. Big thumbs up to everyone adding their expertise here. In the comments I see the most active community members asking for patience and due diligence, this is a strong internal indicator in my opinion of the current state of affairs.
There is a new product on the way, a much more intense conversation to increase community engagement, and quite obviously a need to better decentralise ANT holdings. I believe these successful initiatives could more holistically create a better outcome while reducing risk.
For me, this is the most important discussion indeed - without clarity here, decentralizing a HUGE DAO like Aragon might lead to confusion, resources being wasted and no real value being created.
Doing this decentralization gradually would help a lot to avoid those issues, especially the technical ones.
I may be bringing too much web2 thinking into this, but it sounds like if the proposal is approved we will be working backward from the 30th November deadline.
I agree with @GriffGreen that while there are many details to work out, basically the only one that has to be agreed upon is the MVV.
For all else (non-complete list, based on issues raised here):
- Technical infrastructure
- Off-chain and on-chain governing rules
- Minter contract ownership
- Admin (i.e. AA committee not wanting/able to make the transfer)
- Stakeholder engagement
There could be two working groups per bullet - one towards a best-case scenario and one towards a fall-back option (if the best-case team on each bullet is not ready by 30th November, we use the fall-back option for that bullet for the transition to happen)
Is this broadly what you have in mind, or is there a different path around which there is the soft consensus that you mentioned?
I have to note that I am writing this under the assumption that token holders are the main stakeholder to consider with community contributors to the current AN DAO as well as AA/AL team members beings secondary. TLDR: I am assuming fixing coin-voting is not part of the scope of the currently discussed proposal.
This seems like the right forum for such a conversation. While alternatives might have slightly higher convenience factor, they would go against the aspirations for transparency and inclusion mentioned through the thread
Something that came up during a call with @joeycharlesworth today.
Is this $20M budget to sustain both AA and AL teams or AL-only?
If the second, do you envision the AA team to be dissolved?
I think the budget should be sufficient for a merged entity but curious to get @joeycharlesworth thoughts on this.
Adding the thread for charter changes to keep this focused on the Macro discussions: Charter Updates - Discussion
Thanks @lee0007 for the input.
Certainly, this is a potential and tangible scenario where we might iterate the MVV with the community to build and strengthen their governance knowledge and confidence. A fascinating context where, we could learn from each other while we put the community at the centre, we could collaborate with Commons Stack and @GriffGreen as already mentioned in the proposal.
And this proposal could mark a proven step towards a real decentralisation.
I would disagree, this forum thread is for discussion of this proposal. I am interested in discussing with @GriffGreen the early ideation of alternative/complementary community governance proposals as they relate to use by AN DAO of the CommonsConfig and TAO Voting tooling - which although they could apply here if already implemented, they are not, and currently beyond the scope of this proposal.
Maybe, not this thread, but this forum is the place to have this discussion.
While the way you framed it, it sounds like some small early-stage experiment, the discussion so far leans towards exploring this is as the main governance mechanism for $300m treasury. Furthermore, there is another proposal directly relating to this one, which envisions the discussion of TAO Voting in the Charter.
Proposal 4 : Voting (July 22)
- Addition of Delegate Voting 
- Delegate voting rules 
- Staked ANT Voting Future 
- TAO voting [new]
It would be fantastic to see a ragequit mechanism included in this and similar proposals.