The proposed vote text includes the option of transferring the treasury in 6 to 9 months (plus Abstain, which can be interpreted as “a third option is needed”), and of extending the runway from 6 to 9 to 12 months before syncing funding with the delegative voting system, should it get implemented. I encourage everyone to publicly provide their arguments for why a particular timeline is good/bad so that everyone participating in the vote can make a maximally informed assessment.
With regard to the process of “changing the rules of the game”, what would you say is a better way of doing it at this point in time than having an open, collaborative proposal process and then voting on it? I’ve really tried to make the whole process as public and inclusive as possible but if folks have suggestions/learnings, please make them known, to be taken into account in the upcoming planning/implementation phase, whatever the end goal ends up being.
Mario, I don’t think you are doing anything wrong. I have an external point of view and truly think this path of full decentralization all at once is the best option. And from my understanding, you’ve been fed with information to support your view (which may not have been the most accurate information).
If this proposal didn’t include cutting off funding for a team that has been promised stability and a clear strategy (doesn’t matter if this is right or wrong, what matters is what was promised to them) I BET that the large majority of the team would be supporting it.
In my view, the right way to do this would have been pushing for a total transfer, putting aside a 2 years runaway (or even a one year one) to allow people to decide what they want to do with their careers since a major change in what they have been told happened. This doesn’t mean giving away money that wouldn’t result in value being created (just like MANY of the grants in DAOs in the space), just means we are valuing the work done so far and we allow them to choose their path wisely, while, of course, generating proper value while they are here.
A one-year runaway with the current costs would be around 5% of the whole treasury (which from my low understanding is also way less than what we might pay in taxes to do this transfer) and would signal the team that a transition is happening, and they should prepare for next year.
But. then again, who am I to judge anything… Just trying to represent the voices of people I personally care about and who are going through a lot with the current scenario.
I’d say the ethos of the proposal is not about “cutting off funding” but rather to sync resource allocation with the core of the proposal which is to create an on-chain DAO governed through a delegative voting system. The upcoming vote allows extending the runway to 12 months, and even if Nov 30 ends up the winning option, funding through the on-chain Treasury would still be available. A lot also depends on the implementation plan created after the vote. In other words, I think the DAO has all the tools/resources needed to make this a reasonably smooth transition, should the proposal pass. Thank you for sharing, it’s important!
I will reinforce @mlphresearch’s point, but do you realize that this proposal doesn’t mean cutting off funding to the current team by itself? It only means so if the current team fails to convince ANT holders that they are creating anything of value. So, the question is: do you believe you are creating value? If the answer is yes, you should rest assured and trust in capitalism, which works well and should reward you for value creation. If the answer is no, then your worry is more than justified.
That’s all of course under the assumption that the current team would want to keep being one team and not multiple guilds, which is another possibility that team members could explore at their own will.
I see that so far 20 people (wallets) equivalent to 1.6% of ANT holders voted. I can see how those ANT are split among the options but is it possible to also know how the 20 votes are distributed? I know this is irrelevant to the voting outcome.
Transferring funds as proposed here is not only a waste of money because of the pending taxation by the authorities as explained by @Gabriela( Taxes in Aragon Association, Switzerland) but also a potential tax liability for each individual participant.
Thank you for sharing - I look forward to reading the paper and suggest everyone else to do the same. I would also like to react to your comments by sharing some of my high-level thinking when it comes to public blockchains and DAOs. These are my personal thoughts that don’t represent the views of any organization, nor do they constitute advice of any kind.
Public blockchain networks, smart contract applications, and DAOs are fundamentally an institutional innovation. The fact that this presents a challenge to traditional legal frameworks does not mean that existing frameworks are irrelevant or useless. It simply means that the legal status of these systems is unclear until (a) existing institutions unequivocally not only declare but also enforce it, (b) the communities that build and operate these systems decide to organize according to existing rules/standards, or (c) these systems reach a level of adoption, sophistication, and legitimacy that forces existing institutions to change/adapt accordingly.
Crypto/web3/DAOs are complex emergent phenomena driven by a confluence of factors that are unique to the current stage of the Digital Revolution. To deal with emergent complexity, it is natural to seek support through what is well-understood, i.e. that which is inherited from the past. Wrapping a DAO into an existing organizational format, thereby benefitting from all the legal clarity that comes with it, is a completely rational and viable course of action. But to say that the alternative is “outdated” doesn’t do justice to the ethos and innovation behind crypto/Web3, which - and intelligent people may respectfully disagree here - has the potential to drive global institutional reform, the details of which are still open-ended. It is far from a foregone conclusion that the best path forward for on-chain DAOs is to create a traditional (or minimally adapted) legal wrapper for the whole organization, especially if one considers crypto/web3 as infrastructure for new digital/global institutions and forms of organizing.
I think it would be smart for individuals and organizations that contribute to DAOs to do so in a manner that provides them with legal protection under different scenarios, and it would be smart for DAOs to explore options to help their contributors achieve this goal. Whether this requires a legal wrapper for the DAO as a whole depends on the vision/mission/structure of the organization. The proposal to create an on-chain AN DAO refers back to the original vision behind Aragon and crypto/Web3 more broadly. This vision will need to be reviewed when updating the Charter to decide what exactly is the long-term objective that the AN DAO seeks to contribute towards. I’m hopeful that answering this question will also shine some light on the topic of legal wrappers and whether the DAO as a whole is the appropriate structure to engage with at the level of national jurisdictions, as opposed to pushing for a fundamentally different institutional/legal starting point.
Thank you for sharing your personal thoughts. I do not fully agree with your statements. The legal status of DAOs is clear in most jurisdictions. For example, in Switzerland, where most of the laws are drafted in a technology neutral way, the DAO without a specific legal wrapper just qualifies as simple partnership with unlimited liability for the participants.
If you look at the definition of a simple partnership in the Swiss Code of Obligations, you see that gatherings of people such as happening with DAOs 1:1 correlates with what people already did at the beginning of the 19th century and before, namely:
“A [simple] partnership is a contractual relationship [also oral] in which two or more persons agree to combine their efforts or resources in order to achieve a common goal.”
Because of the unlimited liability of the participants in case of a simple partnership, it is wise to look for another legal structure that perfectly fits with the intention of the gathered people but provides limited liability. Under Swiss law, the result is to establish an association or a cooperative.
Of course, using a legal wrapper only makes sense if the needs of the gathered people (DAO) can be fully accommodated. Adjusting a DAO to a legal wrapper is nonsense and kills the spirit of the Web3 movement. Exactly here comes the association with limited liability into play, which is fully governed by its members. This means that the members can define on how they want to be organized by themlseves and must only rely on “existing” provisions of the law if they do not define something different.
it seems that I still have not succeeded in explaining the association model.
…the legal status of these systems is unclear until (a) existing institutions unequivocally not only declare but also enforce it…
If this is how Swiss authorities have decided to qualify the globally distributed communities that build and operate public blockchain networks, decentralized applications, and DAOs, this is obviously their prerogative. However, it does not automatically follow that choosing a single jurisdiction and then wrapping each such community / DAO as a whole into an existing organizational form in that jurisdiction is the only/best way to ensure that DAO contributors have limited liability. Nonetheless, it should be considered seriously depending on the goals/needs of the DAO in question. As I wrote in my previous comment: wrapping a DAO into an existing organizational format, thereby benefitting from all the legal clarity that comes with it, is a completely rational and viable course of action (assuming that it doesn’t undermine other core principles/goals of the DAO).
Based on your descriptions, I think I have a pretty good understanding of the model. I can’t speak or decide for anyone else, though. It could even be that voters aren’t against the idea of an AN DAO legal wrapper, but simply don’t like the proposed model.
I wanted to bring the attention to a misfortunate but not unexpected problem we ran into. We have been informed that substantial stakeholders cannot vote as they have only unstaked their ANT but have not withdrawn them from Court.
As pointed out in the thread on the draft text thread this is a signaling vote to the AA Committee, and we do not have to adhere to the current Charter. With that in mind:
I would suggest we run the same vote through Snapshot with a strategy where the census is only ANT tokens stuck in Court? In case the strategy cannot exclude tokens in owned wallets, there will be the need for off-chain consolidating of voting to ensure there are no double counts between Voice and Snapshot.
While this is a “hacky way of doing things”, considering that we are talking about ~1M ANT not being able to vote, despite expressed desire to do so, due to the technical limitations of the selected stack, it seems necessary.
It would be great to hear your take and also hear from the Committee on whether that approach would be perceived as a valid signaling @jorge@luis@stefanobernardi@joeycharlesworth (not sure what the handle of Jordi Baylina is)
That’s unfortunate indeed. If it’s possible to set up a Snapshot vote so that, provably, only ANT stuck in Court is voting, I don’t see an issue with setting that up and then just summing the two results off-chain. However, I defer to the AA on the final word here. Also, it would be great for someone technical enough to confirm that Snapshot supports this level of customization in a safe and secure manner.