Proposal: Transfer the Aragon Project Funds to an Aragon DAO Governed by (Delegated) ANT

The proposal below is put forward by Placeholder, an early investor in Aragon and one of the largest holders of ANT. An earlier version of the proposal is available here.

The associated vote is live on Aragon Voice from June 3, 2022 to June 17, 2022.

Proposal Summary

Limit the foundational document of the Aragon Network DAO (AN DAO) to a mission statement, description of the core governance structure/process, and community guidelines.

Set aside funds for the Aragon Association (AA) and Aragon Labs (AL) to continue existing operations up until November 30, 2022. Transfer the remaining funds from the AA to a smart contract address governed through a delegative ANT voting system. Transfer control of the ANT token contract to the same delegative voting system.

All outflows from and changes to the aforementioned contracts, as well as the delegative voting system, will initially be subject to a quorum requirement of 0.3% of ANT circulating, a 60% support threshold, and a minimum implementation delay of 10 days after the end of the voting period. Annual operational expense is initially capped at 10% of the starting (USD) value of the treasury. Annual treasury/yield management is initially capped at 25% of the starting (USD) value of the treasury.


The Aragon treasury and the ANT token contract are currently controlled by a centralized organization, the AA. In order to stay true to the project’s ethos, both should be governed by the AN DAO. The objective of the proposal is to further decentralize the AN DAO by transferring control of the treasury and the ANT token contract to a delegative ANT voting system, while securing funding for the AA and AL up until November 30, 2022. As a result, ANT holders empowered to have a more direct say in how the AN DAO allocates its resources for the long-term success of the project.

Proposal Description

Step 1: Limit the foundational document of the AN DAO, currently the Aragon Network DAO Charter, to a mission statement, description of the core governance structure/process, and community guidelines. The remaining parts of the current Charter are to be reviewed and integrated with the AN DAO documentation, where appropriate.

Finalizing the foundational document should be done in an open and inclusive manner before it can be ratified through an ANT holder vote at any point during the tentative timeline provided below. The same applies to other substantive changes to the AN DAO documentation as it relates to the core governance structure/process.

Step 2: Set aside funds for AA and AL to continue existing operations up until November 30, 2022. The subsequent role of the AA in the AN DAO should be limited to activities that can’t be easily transferred to the various sub-DAOs and guilds of the AN DAO, including but not limited to acting as a legal proxy in contracts and employment agreements with core team members and DAO contributors. After November 30, any funding for the AA and AL from the AN DAO treasury must be approved through the delegative voting system specified in Steps 3 and 4 (and eventually the foundational document of the AN DAO; see Step 1).

Step 3: Establish the AN DAO delegative voting system whereby ANT holders can delegate their voting power to other individuals or entities. At launch, the delegative voting system must meet the following criteria:

  • ANT holders can delegate either all or only part of their voting power.
  • ANT holders retain the right to override their delegates’ votes at any time.
  • ANT holders retain the right to undelegate their voting power at any time.
  • Anyone can propose themselves as a delegate on the Aragon Forum.
  • All delegates must adhere to the Delegate Code of Conduct.
  • Changes to the delegative voting system must be approved by ANT holders according to the requirements specified in Step 4 (and eventually the foundational document of the AN DAO; see Step 1).

At launch, the delegative voting system doesn’t have to support the option for individual ANT holders to distribute their voting power among multiple delegates, but this feature should be added in the future. In case the existing Aragon software doesn’t support the requirements specified in the current proposal, the AN DAO may temporarily rely on external tooling.

The delegative voting system does not preclude the DAO from implementing other voting mechanisms in the future, subject to the requirements specified in Step 4 (and eventually the foundational document of the AN DAO; see Step 1).

Step 4: Create a new contract address for the AN DAO treasury and transfer the treasury (apart from funds specified in Step 2) from the AA to the new contract address. All outflows from and changes to the treasury contract must be subject to a vote through the delegative ANT voting system (specified in Step 3) according to the following criteria (to be included in the foundational document of the AN DAO; see Step 1):

Quorum: 0.3% of total ANT circulating (subject to change)
Threshold: 60% of ANT participating, either directly or through delegation (subject to change)
Annual outflow gap (operational expense): 10% of the starting (USD) value of the treasury
Annual outflow gap (treasury/yield management): 25% of the starting (USD) value of the treasury
Minimum delay between vote approval and execution: 10 days

Transfer control of the ANT token contract to the same delegative voting system.

Approximate Timeline & Voting Requirements

Description Date
Initial proposal forum post April 15, 2022
Feedback period April 15, 2022 to April 30, 2022
Buffer (finalizing) May 1, 2022 to May 20, 2022
Final proposal forum post May 20, 2022
Finalize/publish the vote text May 20, 2022 to May 27, 2022
Buffer (vote preparation) May 27, 2022 to May 31, 2022
Voting starts June 1, 2022
Voting ends June 14, 2022
Implementation (soft deadline) By November 30, 2022 or February 28, 2023 (subject to vote)

Quorum: 0.1% of ANT circulating
Support threshold: Option with the highest support wins

Add-On and Fall-Back Options

The current proposal envisions the AN DAO to operate as a distributed, on-chain entity that may involve contributions from many individuals and organizations around the world. This is uniquely enabled by decentralized coordination technologies, such as public blockchain networks, and represents a novel form of organization native to the Digital Revolution. However, DAO governance is a nascent and evolving field, and what’s viable or optimal may change over time, requiring the AN DAO to adjust its structure and operations accordingly.

Depending on the future role of the AA in the AN DAO, the current proposal does not exclude the option of ANT holders gaining governance rights inside the AA, even if the AN DAO treasury and the ANT token contract are no longer controlled by it. In case the AA fails to transfer the treasury and the ANT token contract to the AN DAO, as a last resort fall-back option, the system specified in Steps 3 and 4 can be implemented within the AA instead. In such a scenario, individual ANT holders would have the option to either become voting members of the AA, or delegate their voting power to other members of the AA. The exact details of such an arrangement should be discussed and specified in the context of a separate proposal.

In case it is officially revealed that transferring the Aragon treasury from the AA to the AN DAO results in a significant tax liability, a separate ANT holder vote should decide whether that’s an acceptable cost of creating an on-chain DAO or whether the AN DAO should explore alternative options, including the fall-back described above.

Related Efforts and Future Outlook

Outside of what’s explicitly stated above, the current proposal is not prescriptive when it comes to implementation details or alignment with other ongoing efforts within the AN DAO to improve its structure and operations. Similarly, the proposal does not preclude any future iterations of the AN DAO governance system as long as these meet the requirements specified in Steps 3 and 4 (and eventually the foundational document of the AN DAO; see Step 1).


I am surprised this proposal is not gaining any traction, considering how substantial its impact could have if passed.

For context on my role in the network:
I work on fostering collaboration within the network as Head of Ecosystem at AA and one of the council members of Aragon Network DAO (we call it Executive-Sub-DAO for to sound cool I guess, but for practical reasons, you can think of it as a council). THat being said any and all opinion here is purely my own and does not represent a consensus of stakeholders.

A few clarifying questions:

  • Do you see this treasury fitting in the current Aragon Network DAO, or you envision an entirely new structure?
  • If the former, probably first, the existing Charter should be heavily revised. Our experience over the past 6 months has shown to be a hurdle rather than an accelerant towards the development of a vibrant contributor community
  • If it’s going to be an entirely new structure, it would be great to share your ideas for how such a DAO will operate (not talking about the on-chain governance itself, but purely operational aspects of completing productive work on the network)
  • What infrastructure do you envision this to be running on? Aragon Client does not support delegation natively, will it be a Governor Bravo setup or another one?
  • What steps do you suggest for improving the cohesion between AA/AL contributions and other initiatives funded by the DAO (this is currently a major pain-point)
  • Will ANT staked in Court have voting power (currently not the case)
  • Considering current voting activity peaks at 0.2% of the network or $250k, transferring $300M+ treasury to be directly governed by token holders considering the low participation seems risky

@fartunov Great questions, and thank you for kicking off the discussion! The original post is intentionally light on implementation details to emphasize the core objective, but the details are obviously important, and I encourage everyone to offer alternative perspectives on the questions @fartunov raised.

Perhaps you can clarify the exact meaning / implications of each option? If the treasury is effectively under the control of ANT holders, isn’t it by definition part of the Aragon Network DAO which is an amorphous, evolving structure that includes the various sub-DAOs, the proposed DAO treasury address, and all ANT holders?

If it’s possible to decentralize the control over the treasury without having to revise the Charter, that would be easiest. However, it might be a good idea to update the Charter regardless.

I think the existing system of semi-autonomous but closely collaborating sub-DAOs that apply for funding from the treasury to execute on a shared roadmap is a good enough starting point. Everything that is working well can be maintained and whatever’s not working well can be reorganized, but that’s outside the scope of the current proposal. I think very few operational details need to be specified prior to decentralizing the control over the treasury through a delegated voting system, but I’m open to be convinced otherwise.

The proposal is not prescriptive when it comes to voting infrastructure. However, given the negative optics of not using Aragon’s own tooling and the fact that delegation is quickly becoming standard DAO practice anyway, this might be a good reason/opportunity to add delegation to the Aragon Client.

First, the DAO should aim to avoid substantial overlap between not only the activities but also the raison d’être of different organizational structures. Once all essential functions are covered without overlap, it’s important to come up with a communication/coordination system that can be maintained even when key individuals leave or new members join the DAO. Unfortunately, it’s not always easy to establish such a system ex ante. The fact that it’s currently a major pain point suggests that the system may need some tweaking but perhaps that’s also better addressed in a separate thread.

In principle, I don’t think participating in the Court should exclude individual ANT holders from voting. Should their tokens be slashed, however, they should immediately lose the corresponding voting power. If that’s currently not feasible, it could be added to a longer-term product roadmap.

Hence delegation and the annual spending cap.

PS. I’ve added some additional info to the beginning of the original post.


Hi @mlphresearch , thank you for kickstarting this proposal to transfer funds from the Aragon Association to ANT holders.

As a committee member of the Aragon Association, I’d like to manage expectations with the community that the ultimate decision to transfer funds from the Aragon Association would reside with the Aragon Association committee. An ANT holder vote will however be an important signal in the decision. Given the amount of funds invovled, it would also be prudent to request advance assurance from the Swiss tax authorities on the transfer.

This said, I’m personally supportive of the initiative as it’s very much line with the ethos of the Aragon project and that of the Association as it’s steward.

Regarding delegate voting, this is not on the immediate roadmap of Aragon App (Aragon’s new DAO framework that will shortly be released on Testnet). Tagging @ramon who is best placed to answer when/if this could be added to the roadmap. I’m of the view that additions of voting types should primarily be driven by community demand. Could we instead aim to include delegate voting at a later date as and when it’s available and audited as a module?

The AN DAO Charter sets out the governance rules of the network with specific provisions to ensure that funds are deployed both legally, and in the best interests of the project. For this reason, I think it’s important that this eventual fund transfer of funds from the Aragon Association should follow the same rules and principles described in the charter.

By many accounts, the charter is due for a significant upgrade and I’d suggest tackling that as a starting point which will help to better accommodate this proposal. Some potential additions to the charter relevant to this proposal:

This should include more detail on the accounting and financial reporting process to be able to track network expenditure, with specific attention given to accounting methods such as accrual vs cash methodologies that will impact whether the DAO is inside or outside of it’s spending cap. To avoid ambiguity, this should be clearly defined in the Charter.

Perhaps doing the spending cap by DAO season would be more intuitive - Seasons @ Aragon

Another topic to think about is how ANT holders will prioritise ANT holder approved funding requests if the aggregate is over budget. First-come first distributed? Some other prioritisation framework?

Is the creation of a new Sub-DAO proposed that would be accountable for network financial reporting? Or would this responsibility be held by an existing Sub-DAO or Guild?

Treasuries and Permissions - p15 of the Charter
“The Main DAO may create additional treasuries through a majority vote of ANT Holders.” - as such, ANT holders could transfer funds to a new vault providing there is ANT holder support. I think this might however require funds to first be transferred to the Main DAO to be compliant with this clause?

Tagging the compliance committee @eaglelex @ronald_k @Tayy for input on this.

Page 16 of the charter would need to be updated. Specifically the 60% support quorum addition.

This should also be added to the Charter, probably under a new dedicated section for Delegate responsibilities.

The current AN DAO Charter requires that all funding proposals specify why the proposal aims to increase the number of active Aragon DAOs. Are you proposing to remove this clause and if so, why?

There are various other important charter changes that have been proposed over the past few months but not yet voted upon, so it might be worth listing those in a separate post @AlexClay with a view to bundling them together with this proposal from Placeholder?

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most of this discussion is outside my purview, however i do recall seeing an Aragon app released by 1hive a bit ago that mentioned delegated voting - the extent to which it is functional or not… @sembrestels or @gabi might know more about it?

it appears to have been audited, however I’m not sure if it was widely implemented?


I will defer to @eaglelex and @ronald_k with respect to this interpretation. Although, from my perspective, this seems correct. Additionally, as indicated in the comments above, the charter framework may need revisions to the Mutable Guidelines for the proposal to pass muster. (Charter pg., 6). Currently, these guidelines apply to all proposals put forth to the Aragon Network. This includes conferring upon the Main DAO apparent supervision over Sub DAOs, including the ability to deploy, dissolve, or spinoff a sub-DAO as an independent DAO (pg.,14c) (pg.,15a-c). Given these stipulations, it is a reasonable inference that the funds must first be transferred to the Main DAO. As such, it is perhaps more beneficial to first amend the charter.


First I will say I am happy to see this proposal. It is bringing the discussion of Aragon’s current governance in a structured manner and this needed to be brought up. I want to see this happen however, I feel pessimistic about the actual effect if passed as is at this current time.

Baby steps is be something to consider here. My concern is that there are whales that can pass everything with such a low participation rate as long as they are a delegate or are close to a delegate. Having baby steps will allow Aragon to work on participation while still moving in the right direction.

Delegating and undelegating your vote also requires participation and attention. Decentralization in this case is dependent on active participation. If participation does not exist then we are back to where we are now but with majority control not only centralized but anonymous.

To support my stance on low participation, we can take a look at one of the most current votes:
Financial Proposal: ESD S1 Budget Request for Continuous Funding of Existing AN_DAO Initiatives

  • 9905 ANT ($40k USD) (55k ANT abstained)
  • 0.1% of supply, which includes the 55k abstained ANT
  • 9905 ANT is $40k to make a decision on the use of $440k

What makes us think things will change with this new structure? I suggest a trial run (baby steps) before making such a large decision, whatever they may look like. Maybe transferring % of the funds and proceeding under this proposed governance structure (once delegated voting is planned, developed, and integrated) and reassessing this proposal for the remaining funds based on results of the trial at which time there will be a positive or negative track record and allow Aragon to learn from the process.


I am really happy to see this proposal. It’s what we always wanted since the Aragon token sale in 2017, which couldn’t happen during those early years due to lack of infrastructure. If we had working DAOs in 2017, we wouldn’t have opened a legal entity to raise funds in the first place – it would have been a DAO.

Now we get the chance to make that right.


Hey thanks for the detailed response!

The TLDR on the first point is both the technical and the governance setup are currently functioning very poorly. If we are seriously exploring injecting $300M+ in there probably should either refactor the whole thing or just copy one of the better-functioning examples we have out there in web3.

The current AN DAO is working off a Govern setup which, after 6 months of struggle, has been proven to be quite difficult to operate, and we are trying to transition most to Gnosis Safes, but it is a very sluggish process. The Charter has received multiple criticisms from pretty much anyone who has looked at it including the authors themselves:

  • A lot of ambiguous and sometimes conflicting instructions
  • Poorly defined roles of sub-DAOs
  • Assumption that Govern functions well

The concept is that this was supposed to be a starting point that should evolve by the time the DAO will have to hold substantial treasury. Despite multiple launching initiatives to change the charter over the past 6 months, attempts to structure a proposal for change have consistently failed. Accelerating the transfer of treasury (originally planned for 3 years from launch) requires urgent changes to achieve rudimentary robustness.

Lastly, the charter was approved by less than 0.2% of the network; dropping the whole treasury there feels somewhat irresponsible.

“I think the existing system of semi-autonomous but closely collaborating sub-DAOs that apply for funding from the treasury to execute on a shared roadmap is a good enough starting point.”

I sincerely wish this was the existing system. There is no shared roadmap and there is very little communication…collaboration is scarce and somewhat obscure in the few places where it occurs

“The proposal is not prescriptive when it comes to voting infrastructure. However, given the negative optics of not using Aragon’s own tooling and the fact that delegation is quickly becoming standard DAO practice anyway, this might be a good reason/opportunity to add delegation to the Aragon Client.”

Fully on board with this - it was identified as an important catalyst for DeFi projects churning from Client already in July/August 2021. However under the assumption Client will be discontinued no work was done. Let’s put forward a proposal to the main DAO to get a team to do this (happy to help on the work required for the proposal)

Unfortunately, it’s not always easy to establish such a system ex ante.

Agree, I was hoping you will have some insight. Let’s get that thread going

“Hence delegation and the annual spending cap.”

Assuming we get delegation off the ground, it sounds reasonable. Still, 10% treasury spent per year based off 0.5% network participation seems a bit off


I think this one is on Gnosis Chain but it could be a great starting point

1hive also recently did some tokenomics & governance work that was impressive

they held dozens of “param parties” and made the change of token and governance structure a community event - and made the process educational & engaging

the cadcad project they used is opensource and approachable - for visual thinkers especially this seemed helpful?


Tao Voting is the Voting App that has delegation and for sure it could be used on mainnet. It is well tested and used by Giveth, TEC, BrightID, 1hive and others.

We would want to do something similar to what ENS and Gitcoin did it but this would need to be a big thing with lots of social outreach.

I love this proposal. All I can say is… FINALLY!


The annual outflow gap of 10% is intended as a safety measure. It is completely arbitrary for any other purpose and can certainly be applied per DAO season instead.

It is definitely best practice to have a treasury oversight function to ensure that funds are used efficiently for their intended purpose. I don’t currently have a strong opinion on whether such a function is best performed by an existing sub-DAO or whether it requires an entirely new structure/procedure. I suppose that depends on what the longer-term organizational roadmap of the DAO looks like.

Operationally, it may be easier to simply upgrade the Charter so that it’s aligned with whatever the final version of this proposal will look like.

Side note: the rationale behind 60% instead of a simple majority was that a very contentious vote suggests that there’s probably a need for an alternative, more broadly supported proposal.

The point about “how outflows from the treasury are organized” had more to do with the timing/structure of payments than their fundamental purpose (e.g. one-time grants vs. milestone-based streams vs. retroactive funding). As long as the mission of the Aragon DAO is to increase the number of DAOs that use the Aragon software, it is perfectly reasonable to have a formal check on whether treasury allocations are indeed serving that mission.

Yes, it would great if an upgraded Charter can be put forward together with the final version of this proposal in the next couple of weeks or so.

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My guess is many ANT holders would feel uncomfortable delegating their voting power to an anonymous delegate. I know that other DAOs have allowed pseudonymous delegates as long as they privately KYC with a trusted entity, e.g. an ecosystem foundation or a DAO governance body.

I would also point out that, even with low levels of participation, liquid democracy is still a more decentralized governance system than relying on a single centralized organization or a multi-sig. The fact that delegation also tends to increase token turnout is a welcome bonus.

It doesn’t need to. Turnout should never be a goal in itself, even though a higher turnout is always preferred. The more important thing is the quality of decision-making, incl. rejecting malicious proposals. As long as tokens are freely transferable (i.e. the holder set is not very carefully curated), the vast majority of token holders are unlikely to have the capacity to pay close attention and participate. That’s why delegation is essential.

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This is a fantastic conversation!

While I would love to see this happen I do not see the “next couple of weeks” as a realistic timeframe due to the extent of already required Charter changes. I personally am in favour of a step-change process for changes to the Charter so that no single, contentious, point of change can prevent other necessary change.

Realistically if we could get the first proposal re:quorum that @AlexClay is working on to the forum first week of May, passed by Mid-May (minimum 14 days) then I think we need at least three other proposals which moves us out to June. We could have this proposal and required charter changes on the forum in June and decided by early July via a rather centralised decision-making process.

So instead I am going to beg for patience and time for the same reason as @brent and to develop some collective consensus and community governance around the process of decentralisation

Specifically, I would LOVE to see us apply a community-consensus process that we’ve seen work wonders. @alibama the Commons Config Dashboard is one of the coolest and most effective decentralisation tools I’ve yet seen.

The Commons Upgrade process enabled the TEC community to test, compare and challenge configurations parameters and eventually vote for consensus. Collective governance is just such a strong position to build from and this is the process I would love to see us model here. Fortunately for us, we have the brilliant @GriffGreen already here!

@GriffGreen is there a TEC team that could help plan and possibly facilitate a similar process for the AN DAO? I would happily help develop a Main DAO or ESD proposal to see AN DAO determine the configuration of our shared commons @Sixto5 @b3n this is the type of learning and experimentation I would love to see taking place

If this is a 4-6 month process then we also have plenty of time - but with the benefit of being timebound - to concurrently sort out the charter before we vote on the configuration we want to decentralise with.


Could I ask what your thoughts are on trying this on a smaller scale? Shifting a portion of the funds and operating for a specified amount of time, reassessing if needed, then doing the remaining funds afterwards. Risks and/or downfalls with this?

The proposal would have a transformative effect on the Aragon organization as a whole. It would tremendously accelerate the pace towards a more marked decentralization. As an observer, who entered Aragon in November 2021, I can imagine that these were not the plans.
I think that there are two different groups of issues that need to be carefully assessed:

    The Aragon Association undergoes juridical rules and its board of directors/committee has to comply with the mission of the Association/Articles of association and legal duties. ANT token holders are not technically members of the Association and the latter is obviously not bound to a decision of the ANT token holders. The implementation of such a proposal would require a sanity check/legal opinion by qualified attorneys and certainly some legal steps regarding the setting of the Association. Moreover, basically “eliminating” the Association creates legal risks for DAO contributors and for people delegated from tokenholders who in the absence of a DAO wrapper would face the risk of unlimited liability. We have good examples of delegated governance as ENS, but they have first created a foundation, which should represent the DAO and limit the liability of the tokenholders.

    The Charter has sometimes slowed down DAO operations and is currently under review by many contributors. It is obviously not a perfect document, but it is the expression of the will of the community. As @joeycharlesworth and @Tayy pointed out, the proposal seems to infringe many provisions of the Charter. To implement a delegated voting system it would be better to work first on a reform of the Aragon DAO governance at a charter level. There are several ways of implementing delegated voting and I think that on the issue more clarity would be required. Otherwise, tokenholders would not exactly know what to vote.

On the merits of the proposal:
The “guarantee” that ANT holders may withdraw the delegation or override decisions taken by delegates does not seem enough in a context in which the engagement in governance by ANT holders is still very low. I think that – at this stage – for the future of Aragon it would be beneficial to enhance the level of engagement in the DAO by important ANT holders. The management of the big treasury does not constitute the immediate problem in my opinion. If the aim is creating a credible delegated voting system (perhaps supported by new Aragon technology), let’s do it. Once we see that it worked out, we can think about the treasury.


Thanks to the proposer for generating the conversation. As always it is hard to add much when following Eagle’s summation.

So I will simply add that after further feedback a cross-discipline, highly coordinated and deeply accountable working group needs to form and take on this task of navigating from current state to optimal and battle hardened governance that we can safely steward this large sum to.

I won’t go into the observed history that makes this statement necessary other than to say that this task here is THE primary coordination challenge for AN DAO right now and should be given the prominence and focus it needs.


It sounds like the DAO has a lot of work waiting after this initial step :slight_smile:

If the existing Aragon tooling isn’t up to the required standard, there’s other infrastructure out there that can do the job. This includes both treasury management and delegated voting.

Minus the 20M in crypto + 10M in stables/fiat for ~2 years of runway for Aragon Labs. Regarding the Charter, the discussion thus far suggests that it needs to be rewritten or simply replaced with a different document.

The 10% cap is a safety measure; it’s completely arbitrary for any other purpose. The 0.5% quorum can definitely be changed. It’s currently on the conservative side (assuming delegation) to ensure that the DAO remains capable of passing proposals. Although higher token turnout is obviously preferred, it’s far less important than the quality of decision-making (incl. rejecting malicious proposals).

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There are three options:

  1. Make minimal changes to the Charter so that it doesn’t contradict the proposal in its current form.

  2. Change the current proposal so that it doesn’t contradict the Charter in its current form (if I’m not mistaken, the Charter doesn’t prohibit a community-governed treasury per se).

  3. Rewrite the whole Charter prior to decentralizing control over the treasury.

The first two options are obviously easier and can be implemented much more quickly. It sounds like the Charter requires a more thorough revision regardless, but that can definitely be done in parts later down the road.

The original proposal has a very narrow objective. As long as it’s possible to implement sufficient fail-safes (currently: delegation, spending cap, and time delay, although the latter would be more effective if combined with a pause mechanism), it may be best to keep it short and simple. While decentralizing control over the treasury is obviously a major step for Aragon, it doesn’t exclude any other changes that have been mentioned thus far.