Juror can be bribed by Party A to claim Party B bribed them


#1

Reviewed cases have only 3 possible outcomes for the ruling: the dispute was flagged incorrectly and the original ruling is served, dispute was flagged correctly and the case is dismissed because both parties attempted to bribe the jury, or the dispute was flagged correctly and ruled in favor of the party that did not attempt to bribe the court.

In scenario 3, where the dispute is flagged in favor of the party that did not attempt to bribe the court, one party, party A, in an attempt to win the case, will bribe a juror to make it seem like he was bribed by party B (through determining an unfair collateral payout or by flagging the other party as the briber). This is an extreme scenario, but if party A provides enough of an incentive for the juror to flag the other side, and the juror could even provide a proof of payment from an anonymous address and fabricate logs, then this juror becomes a single point of failure for the system. I suggest an alternative. Instead of the jury ruling in favor of the non-bribing party, they start a new case, where the previous bribe attempt is logged and can be used as evidence.


#2

I think we need to clarify in the juror agreement/code of conduct what a provable “attempting to bribe the jury is.” I don’t think its possible for us to prove that one party attempted to bribe the juror if that bribe is communicated out of band, but if the bribe is communicated when the party submits evidence to the jury than it is provable (and also not possible for the counterparty to frame the other). I think going into detail about how parties are expected to communicate with the jury would help make this distinction more clear.

Its also worth noting that in general their will be multiple jurors, and rulings can be contested/appealed in order to include more jurors. So in order to successfully bribe, you would need to create a bribe that was able to convince a majority of bribers in the jury, and a majority of jurors in any subsequent appeals.

This would not prevent parties from broadcasting their intention to bribe the other party out-of-band, but doing so would be much less effective. The briber would need to find some way to communicate their bribe to all anonymous and randomly selected jurors, and each juror would need to make an assessment based on whether they think the bribe is likely to influence all of the other jurors (including jurors that would be selected in possible appeals).

In the event that a bribe is successful, if its clear to the public that the decision was the expectation is for most people to simply mutually agree to move their agreements to a different court (likely a fork that keeps the honest jurors reputation but slashes anyone who took the bribe from the previous court).


#3

That clears things up! Thanks!