This financial proposal puts to vote the financial implications of Governance Proposal : Future of the AN DAO Charter. The potential termination of the AN DAO Charter opens up significant risk regarding the balance of funds held in the AN DAO Treasury. The goal of this proposal is to clarify what happens to the balance of the AN DAO Treasury in the absence of a Charter. Without a Charter, any remaining balance would be vulnerable to exploits (anyone could schedule a transaction in Aragon Govern to any wallet address).
- Do we transfer the remaining balance of all AN DAO Treasuries (Main DAO and Sub-DAOs) to the Aragon Treasury* when the Delegate Voting DAO Charter is enacted, prior to the termination of the AN DAO Charter?
*The location of transfer to the “Aragon Treasury” will be to the Delegate Voting DAO, unless the Delegate Voting DAO is not yet deemed safe to receive funds (as decided by the Aragon Association CTO). In the event that the Delegate Voting DAO is not yet deemed safe at the time of this transfer, it will go to the BudgetDAO Multisig as a last resort.
This very much makes sense, thank you. 1 question:
- Is the buffer of 15 days safe in the other proposal to ensure these funds reach the treasury?
It should be, the delay in Govern is 7 days, so there would be a buffer of 8 days for the transaction to be scheduled. This should be plenty of time.
You are discussing abscence of a Charter yet the current governance proposal indicates that a new charter would already be in place - with options of 15 or 30 days before retiring the current Charter
The transfer of funds in multiple places specifies application to AN DAO. So I’m wondering why this vote is needed?
EDIT: Expecting that the new Charter would specify holding/consolidating all AN DAO treasury…
Thanks for spinning this up @AlexClay
I am a proponent on the “reset” by transferring the remaining balances back to the Aragon Treaury wallet (only as it is declared safe of course), that should be hosted by the delegates.
From there we could propose next steps in terms of treasury management (e.g. treasury architecture & treasury management principles).
since most evidence on the subject shows that delegated voting is a mechanism for cronyism and corruption i’m going to largely oppose proposals that convenience adding to more delegated power, right?
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