Expedite Treasury Transfer + Pledge

Note: This is just intended to ignite discussion, and anything we may vote on would take into consideration every response


  1. Expedite the transfer of treasury from Aragon Association to Aragon DAO to complete within 60 days.

  2. Pledge that the treasury will be used to help realize Aragon Project’s purpose and protect it.


It is our belief that this is what token holders actually want more than anything.

It’s been 319 days since the ANT governance voted for the treasury to be transferred to onchain DAO control.

319 days


The root of the problem is the Aragon Association it’s self.

They reflect all that is wrong with larping as a dao: centralized control.

The recent backlash in crypto communities against “repurposing the treasury” is against the centralized control.

Due diligence targets:

These targets are arbitrary and moving, designed to drag out the existence of the Aragon Association.

-Price target?! No comment.

-Wrapping targets are a red herring, if there was a controversial governance vote token holders will wrap if they care - the only thing that matters is that they are sufficiently notified, hence the time requirements of governance.

-Sufficient decentralization of token holders is also a red herring, if it hasn’t happened in $ANTs 5 years of existence when exactly is it going to happen?

-Aragon DAO is already mature enough to make decisions for it’s self (see ~$12 million in approved funds this year alone w/ average vote participation of ~600k wANT). There is already ~5x the amount of wrapped ANT

-The one legitimate concern is contract safety. Hence completion date 60 days. Game theory dictates that exploiters will already exploit at $10mil, $20mil, $30mil rather than risk another exploiter getting there first. We propose a linear transfer of the treasury assets.

Aragon Association’s mandate:


We as token holders appreciate that the Aragon Association must abide by its mandate.

This is why we token holders would pledge that the treasury will be used to help realize Aragon Project’s purpose and protect it.


That’s really a bad idea with the current wANT setup. Anyone could buy a bunch of ANT in the market, then 51% attack the DAO and withdraw the rest of the ANT. Then basically seize all future funds.

This needs to be somehow encoded by having ANT holders have governance power proportional to their long-term commitment. Locking/veANT is obvious here.

Those points aside, I agree with expediting the transfer though.

Without any value accruing to the token, why would people lock veANT? Sorry, but without a clear pivot of Aragon, no one will lock capital in hopes that a team uninterested in being profitable creates a product with good tokenomics and PMF.

There is some “magic thinking” here at play, that DAO hardliners with unlimited money will commit to a failed DAO that got repurposed overnight by the team and doesn’t even hold its treasury. Won’t happen.

You are right in one sense, that a contract exploiter could get ANT governance power and use it. Overwhelmingly contract exploiters move to realize real value immediately and escape to immutable assets, unaware of a case where they sat on a governance token instead - not to say it can’t happen though,

In the case of a “governance attack” where 51% of tokens win a vote, we disagree. It’s fair to say we are near peak awareness of controversial Aragon governance decisions, the topic has recently trended throughout crypto communities and media. Should a pending vote be divisive/controversial holders will wrap, if they care.

The AA will forever try to wave the red herring “not enough wrapped”, it’s the equivalent of setting a quorum too high.

That said, we’ll update our post to reflect that treasury assets should proportionally be transferred to AN DAO, rather than prioritize ANT.

veANT is unsuitable for ANT, there needs to be a fly-wheel effect for it to work.

Specifically veANT doesn’t work to protect treasury against “attack”, it only reduces the attack vectors but makes dissolution more likely. It reduces the likelihood of short-term actors passing a buyback, because they cant benefit from the increase in price. However, crucially, it does not affect actors seeking dissolution. Game theory dictates they will max-lock as they can still benefit in a dissolution, whilst actors against dissolution won’t max lock, so with veANT the “attackers” end up with more voting power vs a wANT governance dynamic.

1 Like

Just flagging that it is Aragon DAO not AN DAO.

I think that we probably need to add something in that is a hard rule for the pledge. Once the assets are transferred there is nothing to stop it simply being changed.

That being said, I find Luis’s idea around long term locking of a portion with veANT interesting that does need explored further. Think this can go alongside some buyback. Short term realignment with longer term thinking added in.

Indeed there should be incentives for locking veANT. I’ll post a proposal later today.




Imagine 2 groups of voters against dissolution:

  1. ANT maxis, don’t care about financial burden of assets being locked up for longer. If they were not already max locked they would be happy to max lock.

  2. ANT supporters, but not maxis, shorter investment time horizon, not willing to lose access to ANT for many years.

In a veGOV dynamic, these two groups combined vote is proportionally less than in a wANT governance dynamic.

1 Like

Sorry, I’m not following. ANT maxis will lock for long as you stated, therefore having more gov power, and if they are ANT maxis probably they believe in the mission and don’t want a dissolution.

1 Like

Both the two groups in the example were against dissolution. The ant maxis would lock, and the other voters against dissolution but not maxis wouldn’t lock for long. It’s their combined vote that is not max locked, vs wANT governance where their votes would be treated equally.

Hopefully the following example helps explain it.


im still really confused at the ve idea… ve was a short lived narrative that is now almost a meme in the space.

First issues at hand is getting the treasury transfer to the DAO expedited

Next is finding a solution within the DAO to fix MC to TV parity.

Ve just adds nuances and more technical issues to a rather simple process…

Unless ANT price > book value, and in that case there’s no incentive to 51% attack the DAO.


The reason I kickstarted this whole proposal is to try and fix the core issue, which is the MC to TV parity that creates the opportunity for a 51% attack. From there, the DAO design and transition can be quite simple. And simple is speedy.


i also dont understand the continued use of 51% attack, I think its undermining -

Was the vote to transfer the treasury a 51% attack? - no

Why has that not continued outside of 300k - why did it take so long to start?

Nobody has proposed anything malicious here. Also just because people want to vote for something that the team may not be in favor of does not make it a 51% attack. Just governance,

simply my 2c here. Appreciate the dialogue as always

I wasn’t saying it was a 51% attack. It wasn’t. I’m just saying the DAO needs protection against attacks like that!

Yes agreed simple and speedy. so I do not see the need or want from anyone outside you or Joan that really thinks ve is a good idea / one that will bridge this solution, We should focus on other solutions - buybacks/inverse bonds/lbps

sure! But you/team have continued to call this movement to bring parity to an issue a 51% attack, which is untrue.

Thats more my point!

Hope we can continue the discussion around MC and TV parity and solutions that are effective and timely.

FYI I’ve been talking about the issue with 51% attacks for years, but they were theoretical until recently. For me it’s not whether we are undergoing one or not (obv not right now), but it’s the main attack vector for a DAO with treasury > mkt cap.

1 Like

In the screenshot of this post the team originally said they need more ant wrapped in order to move the funds to the DAO

Now, tons of ANT has wrapped, and instead of saying “we got what we wanted let’s move the funds” the response is “too much ant was wrapped and might vote for things we don’t like so its an attack”.

All parameters that the team asked for to move the treasury have passed, please let’s move it and start winning.

It’s also a bit crazy that the team says the DAO only has $300k, but was able to vote to spend $12M for development, growth, donations to nation3, eagle operations, zk research, etc.

If thats the case then these and all funds must already be considered owned by the DAO.

That was stupid, and anyone who has followed Aragon knows that exactly the same thing happened with our first governance process, AGP. Wished we’d learn from mistakes!

FYI there’s no donation. It was a token swap. Not the first one to happen, and hopefully not the last (and a big advantage of the DAO having more ANT is being able to do more of those).

1 Like