Discussion: Should ANT be the native token of Aragon Court?

Aragon One proposes to switch the native token of Aragon Court from ANJ to ANT. ANJ holders will be compensated with ANT to ensure they can continue participating in Aragon Court with equivalent economic weight. To complete this transition, we further propose increasing the circulating supply of ANT by 549,862.203524394 ANT. The newly minted ANT will be used to fund a redemption contract that will exchange and permanently remove from circulation all ANJ at a rate of 0.015 ANT per 1 ANJ.

ANT holders review and vote on the full proposal using snapshot.

Aragon Blog post regarding the rationale for this proposal.


I am planning to vote yes on this proposal, because the goal is clear and makes a lot of sense. However, the specifics of the transition are unclear to me.

  1. I didn’t know that there was functionality to allow minting of new ant as desired. What governs this ability currently? (Seems to be the 5 address Governor Council - who do these represent?)

  2. Because I haven’t been following the bonding curve, is this a premium or net equivalent exchange?

  3. The process for migration can be costly from a gas perspective given how much ANJ someone has. They would have to unstake, migrate and then stake again. Has this aspect and cost to existing users been considered?


Will ANT BPT and/or ANT UNI LP token also be stake-able in Aragon Court?

The Community Multisig is currently in control of the ANT contract. There’s some information here: https://aragon.org/blog/ant-controller

More about the Community Multisig: https://wiki.aragon.org/association/multisigs/community/

It’s a slight premium as the bonding curve has been paused at a price of 0.0148 ANT per 1 ANJ. See https://convert.aragon.org

1 Like

Please explain why ANT holders should be granted the privilege of voting on this decision?
You have denied agency to ANJ holders.
This is antithetical to this movement and completely against the ethos of what we are building here.

ANT holders != ANJ stakeholders.

Right now, the court stakeholders are ANJ holders… you have issued a vote to ANT holders, asking them if they want to become members of the court. Why would they not say yes?
Previously you had a committed group of stakeholders who had forfeited any rights they had within the ANT network, to become members of the court. This contribution now goes completely unrecognised.

This snapshot should have gone out to ANJ holders… first. Second, and only if approved, it then goes out to ANT holders who have to agree to be diluted 1.3%

As an ANJ holder, why would one want their power to be diluted by an pre-existing token distribution, that reduces their ability to become a juror by up to 95% (theoretically)? Now any old ANT holder can come and choose, as they please, whether to engage in the court.

One could even argue that an ANT whale may act nefariously within the court system (after all, what do they have to lose?) Looking merely at market capitalisations of projects as a proxy for security is shortsighted.

Further to that, anyone who invested in ANJ since 12 Aug, and who is now underwater, is getting forced to have exposure to some other token/ecosystem that they may not necessarily want involvement in.

Poorly thought out in my humble opinion… You must do better to incentivise the growth of this network, and therefore its security. This is not a quick fix.


Some thoughts:

-I don’t mind the two tokens being merged, it’s probably less confusing - but at least consider rewarding current ANJ investors and jurors with a takeover premium as a thank you for their belief in the court project so far. And maybe cover the cost out of the foundation/network treasury, instead of diluting ANT/ANJ holders.

-The ANJ-ANT merger sounds fine in principle, but the handling of it doesn’t feel quite fully thought through. Effectively you are saying - whoops, ANJ was a mistake, let’s revert (and inflate the total supply of ANT by ~2%). Hey ANJ holders - thanks for the support so far, we decided it doesn’t make sense so we’re converting your tokens back at 0 premium. BTW, you’re welcome to pay the gas for unstaking, conversion and re-staking yourself (if you want to hang around).

-Typical takeover premium is normally 20-40%

-If the vote doesn’t pass (I think it will), where does that leave faith in ANJ and the court project?

-The new proposal addresses the security concern mentioned by Delphi Research, but makes no mention of the other salient points in their research piece. Most importantly, no mention of better incentives to the jurors and investors who believe in Aragon court, have participated in it so far, and continue participating. Regardless of the conversion or 1 or 2 tokens - try to address the juror/supply side incentives issue mentioned in Delphi Research article

Please correct me if I have misunderstood something.

Overall, I think a little more public discourse would have been nice before going ahead with the proposal.


I agree with what Jessej and James have said.
Althought something needs to be done in order to make the Court project successfull, this solution:

  • seems poorly thought out
  • too rushed
  • has a completely top-down approach
  • doesn’t give any voice to stakeholders (ANJ holders), not even a premium is recognized!

I do concur with this sentiment. This was going to be my follow up comment. My vote would have been the same regardless, but the lack of empowerment to ANJ holders is something that should have been considered.

Current ANJ Juror

I agree, the lack of consideration for ANJ holder is concerning.


that thing wasn’t profitable at all.but i kept voting anyway cause i like the project and idea.I think it’s ok to switch tokens but you should ask ANJ holders at least.
I agree with Jesse’s statement, some reward for loyalty sounds fairly.


What if we keep ANJ as the token of the Court but instead dissolve Aragon Network and allow people to burn ANT in exchange for funds from the treasury? :smiling_imp:


Let’s keep the thread on topic. If you want to create a new proposal please create a new thread.

Hope people can recognize the error and fix it.
If there is a problem with Aragon Court it makes no sense taking action without consulting at all ANJ stakeholders. Even though this might be a reasonable solution (I don’t know yet, should take some time to gather more information and organize thoughts), rushing a decision in this way sounds inappropriate to say the least.

1 Like

What the first section you quoted refers to is that if an ANJ holder has 1000 ANT worth of “economic weight” today, they will also have 1000 ANT worth of “economic weight” if they accept the redemption offer (actually they’ll have a little bit more economic weight since there’s a small premium on top of the current exchange rate, and all ANJ holders will be entitled to this rate, not only those who exit first as would be the case if they were cashing out via the bonding curve).

In what way specifically do you think the economic weight of ANJ holders is changed by this proposal?

1 Like

Thank you for explaining. I think going by the value of holdings and by share of the total supply are both valid ways of measuring economic weight. In this context, what is being referred to is the value of holdings.

1 Like

Hi all,

Thanks so much for all the comments, questions and concerns. As proposal creators, we hear them loud and clear.

Your concerns are making us reconsider our communications strategy around Aragon Court and what’s coming next.

We have been working on supply-side incentives and improved fee models, of which we consider this proposal a precursor. Initially, we planned to share this information later on, but given the circumstances we are currently preparing documents for jurors, ANT holders, and everyone else to review as our top priority.

We are going to need some time to clean up some of our latest research and strategy work to get it ready for publishing, so we appreciate your patience in the meantime.


I also just want to add in my opinion that I don’t think this is fair to ANJ holders.

Early adopters of ANJ saw the upside potential of it and now it feels like a bit of a rug pull that ANJ’s effective market cap in a sense is being moved up 20x while the price is remaining just about the same.
What if that extra ANT which is being minted to make the conversion was instead just put into the ANJ <-> ANT bonding curve? Why not rather have a vote which would move enough ANT into the bonding curve to make ANJ have a market cap high enough to be considered secure (are there even any high-stakes ballots on Aragon Court yet)? Then there would be an incentive for people to put more money into ANJ and drive up the market cap… if that’s what the problem is. If the market cap is the issue, why not try to get ANJ listed on more exchanges and get more educational/informational content out there to drive adoption?

Making an exchange via the bonding curve really wasn’t all that difficult if you consider the number of people using relatively complex yield farming strategies. ANJ, to me, was a unicorn sort of token, having a market cap so low and such amazing potential. If it is just casually merged into a token with a market cap 20x higher but a price that is essentially the same as it was, that feels sort of unfair to those who bought it in the first place.

Just my 2 cents.


Disclaimer: Delphi Ventures has taken a position in ANJ. While we have sought to consider this proposal as independently as possible, our opinion may be biased by our holdings.

As we pointed out in our report (you can read a summary of our conclusions in our recent governance forum post here), we agree that security is a problem for the Court. However, we do not think this is the right solution for a few different reasons:

(1) As @Xeus pointed out, the cost of a 51% attack is a function of the tokens actively staked by jurors rather than just market cap. Simply merging ANJ into ANT won’t fix this unless it’s accompanied by things like an improved fee model and/or supply-side incentives such as those we described in our recent proposal.

(2) Given that the real problem is not market cap but rather actively staked tokens, we believe it will actually be easier to incentivise juror participation and therefore security using ANJ rather than ANT.

ANJ’s $6M MC and the potential upside this represents effectively acts as additional incentive for jurors over and above the supply-side incentives. If we combine this with the improved fee model and supply-side incentives that we describe in our proposal, we’re confident ANJ will have little trouble bootstrapping a strong juror community.

Our initial conversations with our clients seem to bear this out as response to the report has been excellent with many expressing interest in ANJ. Having spoken to them about the potential conversion, most expressed the same concerns we did and were much less interested in participating. While harsh, this should not be surprising as YFI and others have shown the potential for token performance to attract and nurture an extremely strong community. We believe Aragon should not underestimate the potential to build a strong, independent community around ANJ, and that this will ultimately benefit ANT more broadly.

(3) The Court is a separate stakeholder base with a different set of cryptoeconomic incentives than ANT holders. We believe there are advantages to keeping these separate, especially given the MC and existing stakeholder base of ANT may pose its own security risk to the Court, particularly if juror participation rates remain low.

(4) Having gotten to know the ANJ community a bit during our research process, we’ve found them to be knowledgable, smart and long-term oriented, especially for such a small MC project. We also found surprisingly little overlap with ANT holders, indicating a largely independent group of stakeholders. While this doesn’t apply to us, we feel this move by Aragon may risk alienating this existing ANJ juror community, especially given the purchase price and the fact that ANJ holders are not able to vote on their own destiny.

If a merger was to be executed (which we advise against), we feel it should: a) at least be done at premium to the market price as is typical with takeovers of this sort in traditional markets b) enable ANJ holders to vote in proportion to their converted ANT holdings.

To conclude, we feel an independent court token is better for the product, for the community and ultimately for ANT holders too. To address security issues, we feel the combination if improved fee model, suspending the bonding curve and implementing well-designed supply-side incentives will be sufficient to bootstrap a strong juror community and consequently the Court’s security.

Regardless, we do understand there are tradeoffs and operational efficiencies gained by moving to one token, and we will respect whatever decision the Aragon community arrives at. We’re hugely excited about the Aragon vision and look forward to working together to support the team/community moving forwards.


My preference is to see changes in order to support slow but steady growth of ANJ, not merging it with ANT.