Authors: Samantha Marin, with help and feedback from Alex Clay, Ivan Fartunov, Jessica Smith, and Mario Laul.
This is a procedural document that outlines a possible delegated voting plan for the AN DAO. This document is not intended to replace the charter, but build a basis for large scale decision making in the DAO following the treasury transfer.
We are the Aragon Network DAO, a DAO that builds products for the next generation of DAOs. We’re a product DAO that ships industry-leading, open-source, blockchain-enabled technology.
- DAO Members: ANT holders.
- DAO Contributors: Any ANT holder who is part of a guild, subDAO, or working group in the AN DAO. DAO Contributors may have governance rights in their respective guild/subDAO/working group.
- DAO Core Contributors: Any ANT holder part of a guild/subDAO/working group who works in a full-time capacity for the AN DAO and/or is in a leadership position. DAO Core Contributors may have governance rights that go beyond their fellow contributors, such as veto power or more votes.
- Delegates: Individuals who vote on matters for the entire DAO, using tokens that have been delegated to them. Delegates don’t have automatic special power in guilds/subDAOs/working groups. If they are a core contributor in Aragon, they must state conflicts of interest on proposals that directly impact them, and can choose to abstain from votes in which they have those conflicts.
In this structure, the Aragon Network DAO will use delegated voting to ratify decisions. ANT holders can delegate their ANT tokens to one or more delegates. There is no token allocation cap to be a delegate, but there is a cap in order to be paid to be a delegate.
Each on-chain vote will be live for 7 days, with a 3 day timelock following the results.
The 11 paid delegates will be chosen every 12 months by an ANT vote, where ANT holders allocate certain percentages of their tokens to the various delegates. The 11 prospective delegates who receive the most percentage of the ANT votes will become the paid delegates for the following 12 months.
The two aspects of the application process are the written application and the community AMAs (sync or async).
Delegates can run again after their previous 12-month term, and token holders may choose to delegate to the same person as before.
Delegates can be either individuals or small groups/organizations.
- Written application: These statements will be stored in a public repository. Please be short and concise.
- ETH address
- ENS name, so delegators can easily identify you
- Discord username
- Twitter handle
- Reasons for wanting to be a delegate
- Web3 interests (choose 5 or fewer)
- Accessibility, Bridges, Cryptography, DAOs, Data and analytics, DeFi, Developer tools, Economics, Events, Environment, Gaming, Governance, Identity, Infrastructure, Legal, Messaging, Music, NFTs, Oracles, Privacy, Security, Self-management, Social impact, Visual art, Wallets, Writing, Zero knowledge.
- Qualifications and experience
- Technical experience
- In your words, what is Aragon?
- Community AMA: Delegates will need to answer community questions, whether in written format or a video AMA.
- Here, the community members will ask the prospective delegates questions. This will help ANT holders determine where to delegate their tokens.
- The documents and/or session recordings will be made public.
There will be a two-week application period, where prospective delegates can submit their applications. The vote will begin two weeks before the previous delegate period expires, and will end one week before the period expires. On the expiration date of the previous delegation period, all tokens will be returned to the original holders, who can then choose to re-delegate to the next round of delegates.
March 1 (day 1): Delegate application period opens.
March 2-13 (days 2-13): Written applications and AMAs are held.
March 14 (day 14): Delegate application period closes at midnight UTC.
March 15 (day 15): Delegate vote is held—ANT holders use the written applications and AMAs in their decision making process.
March 22 (day 22): Delegate vote concludes. 11 paid delegates are selected.
12 month term begins March 22.
- Token Minimum: All paid delegates must have at least 0.1% of the total circulating ANT share to be able to vote.
- Token Maximum: No delegate may receive more than 3% of the total circulating ANT share. Delegates must close off to additional delegation once they reach the 3% threshold. Any delegate who goes beyond 3% will receive a one-week warning. If they still have 3%+ after that week, their wallet will be barred from voting.
- Term Limit: Paid delegates have a 12 month term limit. Once their limit is reached, tokens will be returned to holders, who will need to re-delegate. Token holders can re-delegate to the same delegate if they choose. Delegates must announce one month before their term limit expires or personal resignation, so token holders can re-delegate.
- Compensation: Delegates will be modestly compensated a base rate of 3,000 USDC per month (flag for the community, should it be more to attract more technically proficient delegates?). All delegates will be compensated the same, no matter the number of tokens delegated to them.
- The only way to raise delegate compensation is with a 1-of-1 vote from the DAO members, not a token-weighted vote where delegates control votes.
- In addition to the 3,000 USDC, delegates are compensated on a sliding scale based on the percentage of tokens allocated to them.The structure could look something like this:
- 0.10% to 0.30% = an additional 750 USDC per month
- 0.31% to 0.50% = an additional 1,000 USDC per month
- 0.51% to 0.70% = an additional 1,250 USDC per month
- 0.71% to 0.90% = an additional 1,500 USDC per month
- 0.91% to 1.20% = an additional 1,750 USDC per month
- 1.21% to 2.20% = and additional 2,000 USDC per month
- 2.21% to 2.99% = an additional 2,250 USDC per month
- The minimum a delegate earns monthly is 3,000 USDC. The maximum is 5,250 USDC.
- Delegate payment is income. Do your own research as to how your jurisdiction taxes income.
- Signaling: Delegates must post on Twitter, Discord, or Forum how they plan to vote 48 hours before the on-chain vote begins. This allows delegators to move their tokens if they do not agree with the voting stance. The Snapshot vote (described below) is also an important part of the signaling process.
- Strikes: Delegates will be subject to a “three strike” system. Strikes include missing on-chain votes and voting differently than their signal. If they reach three strikes, their wallet will be barred from voting. Discourse and Snapshot signaling votes are highly encouraged, but will not be punished if missed.
- Vote in the way they feel best benefits the Aragon Network as a whole, not a small group.
- Operate “open by default,” meaning they share their ideas and opinions with the greater ecosystem.
- Make an announcement one month prior to stepping down (if mid-term) or if they don’t plan to run for the next term limit. This allows ample time for new delegates to prepare statements.
- Put forth their own proposals and ideas for the DAO, and shepherd them through completion.
- Check on workstreams to have full transparency of how those workstreams are running.
- Take their job seriously, putting time into reading and understanding each proposal.
- Call upon subject matter experts if they need help understanding the proposal.
- Represent the Aragon ecosystem, both in our internal channels and externally, such as through conferences, Twitter, articles, podcasts, and more.
- Operate with professionalism.
- Exceed their 12-month term limit without a re-delegation period.
- Exceed the 3% maximum token threshold.
- Bribe delegators for votes.
- Collude with other delegates for malicious reasons.
- Actively campaign for tokens.
- Raise their compensation via a delegated vote. Rather, that must be done via 1-1 voting.
Proposals, or Aragon Governance Proposals (AGPs), are fully-formed ideas that are ready for the DAO’s feedback. Proposals are polished, thoughtful, concise, and free of jargon.
- Title: clear and concise, not vague or confusing.
- Short description: think of this as a TLDR or abstract.
- Longer description: the meat of the proposal. Include the scope of the project here, too.
- Technical specification (if necessary): for proposals that include code or necessary legal jargon, add those in here. Think of this as the “expert deep dive.” Most proposals won’t need this—it should all be in the longer description.
- Metrics or Key Performance Indicators: if the proposal passes and you begin working on it, what metrics or KPIs will you use to show progress?
- Team description: who will be working on and shepherding this project? Describe them and their relevant experience.
- Next steps if passed: describe what your first few weeks will look like if this proposal passes.
All proposals should be aligned with Aragon’s manifesto and its mission, vision, and values.
- Proposal is posted to Discourse for 1-person-1-vote signaling, with a poll with the following options: “Yes, move to Snapshot” and “No.” Discourse quorum and pass rates are still being determined—up for debate on the forum.
- Discussion and voting period: Minimum 7 days, maximum 14. The proposer is responsible for moving the proposal to Snapshot and not letting proposals linger on Discourse for more than 14 days.
*The proposer may post a second draft of the proposal, if comments warrant it. The draft should be live for 7-14 days with a poll.
- Proposal is posted to Snapshot for token-weighted signaling. Snapshot quorum and pass rates are still being determined and up for debate on the forum.
- Voting period: 7 days.
- The proposer must go to the original Forum post on Discourse, edit their post with “This post moved to Snapshot on [DATE]” or “This post did not pass and was deprecated on [DATE].” This is so external parties can see what happened to proposals.
- Proposal is posted to the chosen voting platform for token-weighted, on-chain confirmation. On-chain vote quorum and pass rates are still up for debate.
Once the proposal has passed the on-chain vote, it is up to the proposer to shepherd and ship the idea. The proposer may gather a team to assist them, but they must be responsible for executing the proposal.
Any ANT holder can fork the Aragon Network DAO at any time. To fork the DAO, an ANT holder may post a proposal to Discourse outlining their planned fork of the DAO. This proposal does not need to be voted on, because the proposer may simply create their own fork by themselves. The fork proposal is simply a way to signal to other interested parties that a fork is occurring.
- Has its own token, separate from ANT.
- Operates in a separate Discord, Discourse, Snapshot, and voting platform.
- Exists because of irreparable differences between the original DAO and the forked version.
All governance experiments must be run in a small group prior to putting forward a proposal to the DAO. No governance experiment will be used on the wider DAO level in an untested state. Guilds and subDAOs should write their own governance charters and use that as a testing ground for new methods, then take those learnings to the larger DAO. An example of a guild running its own governance experiment and sharing it with the larger DAO: Writers Guild of BanklessDAO.
Once a governance model has been proved in a small group, that group may propose trying the model on the DAO-wide scale. Metrics and data on how the governance model went are necessary to include in the proposal, and members of that group should be able to speak on how the model can be used at a wider scale.
What do you think of this procedure? I’d love to hear feedback in the comments and the poll below.
Leave a signalling vote here, so I know where to take this draft next:
- Yes with no edits/minor edits
- Yes with heavy edits
- No, another structure entirely