ANT snapshot - A snapshot of ANT balances will be taken and used to determine votable ANT per address during the pilot. The snapshot will occur at block 10724590 or approximately Wednesday, August 26, 12pm UTC. Be sure to have your ANT in your preferred address by the snapshot. Because of the snapshot, you are free to do whatever you like with your ANT after the snapshot and still retain the voting power from the snapshot.
Do I have to pay gas to vote on proposals? Is it possible to vote on proposals via MyCrypto? If I move ANT after the snapshot i will still be able to vote but only with this address or can i somehow move the votable ANT ? Is it possible that you hold ANT in address A but you will receive the votable ANT in address B?
Conviction accrual - Once a vote is cast, the token-weighted balance adds conviction potential to the proposal with conviction accruing over time as tokens are held . The time-based accumulation forces voters to prioritize where they place their conviction. Proposals are approved once their conviction accrual level meets the approval threshold .
Is it possible to create a combination of conviction voting and quadratic voting? So that your stake get more voting power the longer you stake but with a negative exponential curve. the more you stake to one proposal the less power each stake token will have. This would incentivize users to stake to more proposals to increase their voting power. Also it would make the voting more democratic because multiple small votes (token stakes) have more influence than few big votes. The problem is that a user can just split her tokens into multiple accounts and increase the voting power this way. quadratic voting just makes sense in combination with unique IDs. Perhaps users with a verified brightID can activate quadratic voting. So that small stakes in combination with a brightID have more voting power. For example 1 token stake on a proposal gives you 10 voting power, 2 stake gives you 9 power, 3 gives you 8. So if you stake 3 tokens you have a voting power of 27. This would give small stakers more voting power and make the governance more democratic.
Threshold calculation - The approval threshold for a proposal depends on its budget in proportion to the treasury funds. Therefore, proposals with larger budgets require more conviction to pass than smaller budgets. As proposals are approved, and the treasury depletes, all proposals’ approval threshold will increase , requiring more conviction to pass.
Would it make sense to create multiple small Conviction Funding DAOs with specific funding purposes (funding categories) to value the funding money more? This way users can choose categories they are more interested in and specialize on those to vote one. This would make the distribution of funding more efficient and less wasteful, cause the approval threshold would be higher because the budget would be split up in smaller budgets (Conviction Funding DAOs). So the Snapshot is taken and you get votable ANT which you 1. use to upvote the different Conviction Funding DAOs (conviction voting on DAOs) In return you get voting tokens in those DAOs which you can use in the 2. step to vote on the Conviction Funding DAO specific proposals. The longer you stake your voting tokens to 1. the Conviction Funding DAO the more voting power (conviction) you get and the longer you stake to 2. Conviction Funding DAO specific proposals the more voting power (conviction) you accumulate as well.
Approvals - Upon approval, the payout process is initiated automatically so work can begin as soon as possible. If a proposer fails to deliver, their reputation in the community will diminish and likely lack support for future proposals.
Why not implement something like time-released-payments? In this way people can check wether the proposal is on track with their milestones/timeline and if not they can hold the next payment unit the proposal is on track again.
