Common court with Kleros proposal

I generally disagree with this position. I think there ought to be some sort of middle ground where teams can maintain an independent identity, vision, and roadmap – while remaining both economically and culturally aligned with the Aragon Network and its constituency.

I think the bonding curve does a good job of providing economic alignment, and in terms of cultural alignment I think that Clement has expressed the sentiment that he and his team are aligned with those values.

When I imagine the Aragon Network as a successful and largely autonomous digital jurisdiction–it is not because every participant has adopted Aragon branding and produce products/services with Aragon in the name… its because you have independent teams with independent identities and visions aligned around common infrastructure and adopted structures which align their success with that of the Aragon Networks success, and in return they become preferred by Aragon’s constituency.

I see the top down grants process that we have for Nest and Flock as a bootstrapping mechanism, but not a long term solution, and I would like to see more experimentation with novel approaches to incentive alignment. And I am largely supportive of the idea of Kleros’ linking PNK with ANT…

However, I also don’t really get or agree with the framing from Clement’s side about the morality (or lack thereof) of forking. There seems to be a lot of dissonance between “its open source” and “its okay to fork” or use the ideas and reimplement them–just not in this case. This doesn’t make sense to me, I think the ability to fork (software or networks) is one of the most interesting aspects of the decentralized space and the thing that I think is most likely to ensure that these things that we are building have net-positive social impact.

Clement has stated repeated that if Aragon’s implementation was more different it would be less of an issue:

However, the fact is that it is an entirely separate implementation, and will likely continue to diverge over time.

Reading between the lines, It seems that the only issue in this case is that the Aragon Court is perceived (or is in reality) a threat to Kleros’ market position or future prospects.

I am absolutely okay with the idea of forking protocols and replacing the token with ANT derivatives, funding the development of those forks and prioritizing features that ANT holders deem a priority.

In fact I wrote a whole blog post last year, Community Aggregation Theory :cat2: - Aragon - Medium, discussing how communities (and their native currencies) can use their unique values, ideologies, and governance to aggregate value by systematically forking protocols that do not 1) accept or accrue value to their preferred currency, 2) operate inefficiency and extract to much value.

It’s my belief that community and governance are where value will accrue precisely because any specific service protocol built on open infrastructure and open source code can and should be forked until it is commoditized.

I also do not see this as a threat to Aragon’s users, because I don’t think Aragon’s target user base is service protocols targeting Aragon DAOs–I see Aragon’s target user as communities of open source software developers, freelancers, forums, political parties/activists, etc. The types of things that you need to do collective fund management or decision making, but would probably not normally be something that you would incorporate with a traditional legal entity.

I also think that in the case that an entrepreneur is trying to create a service protocol that might otherwise compete with the Aragon Network, linking the token to ANT from day one using a bonding curve is a win, win. It provides a baseline level of liquidity, and the ANT that is held as collateral can be used by the project vote in AGPs and direct resources and priorities related to the underlying Aragon infrastructure. And by doing so removes the motivation for the Aragon Network to fork their service protocol in the first place.

Getting back on topic… at this time regardless of how this proposal goes I don’t think it makes sense to stop working on Aragon One’s implementation of the Court. Dispute Resolution is so critical to unlocking the most impactful DAO use cases that having multiple teams working independently towards making the best possible solution seems reasonable.

I would also love to see Kleros choose to become more actively engaged and a legitimate stakeholder in the Aragon Community–They could do this by linking PNK and ANT using Aragon Fundraising when it launches, and as people lock up ANT in the bonding curve the Kleros Cooperative or Kleros DAO could use that ANT to influence future AGP decisions and perhaps allocate some resources towards their project. This doesn’t require a proposal or permissions form the Aragon Network, and it would provide an addition fundraising vehicle for the Kleros team (instead of their selling the remainder of their PNK in a follow on IICO).

The benefit to Kleros is that that it would put the Aragon Court and Kleros Court on equal economic footing and remove any underlying barriers to collaboration, while at the same time giving them more control over the underlying infrastructure that they have adopted for their projects governance.

Assuming this were to happen, I would also likely support Nest grant(s) with specific deliverables focused on integrating Kleros as an option for proposal agreements in Aragon.


This sound super interesting but i don’t understand it. how would you link PNK and ANT and why would I lock up ANT in this bonding curve and why can the Kleros DAO then use my locked up ANTs to vote?

i dont understand that as well. for that Kleros need a good USP in order to comete against Aragon and when aragon can fork everything from Kleros where is the point for Kleros to exist. at the end of the day the tokens comepte with each other and ANT holders want that the price of ANT goes up. To prevent a competion between ANT and Kleros tokens there has to be a official agreement or something like this?

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Aragon Fundraising uses the agent app to manage the collateral reserves. This allows for a “safe execute” role, which can be used to perform actions on behalf of that address while restricting certain actions like transferring tokens. This means that an organization using fundraising can actually vote with the AGP process with the ANT that is collateralizing the bonding curve.

If PNK is attached to a bonding curve that is collateralized by ANT, the Kleros Court would offer similar upside to ANT holders that the Aragon Court would since the intention is not to use ANT directly for staking in the court but rather use “ANJ” a derivative of ANT based on a bonding curve.

The tokens would compete with each other, but there wouldn’t be an incentive for ANT holders to use defaults in the Aragon Client to bias users towards the Aragon Court over the Kleros Court, because from an economic stand point it doesn’t matter which of the two ends up being more successful as both will lock up ANT in a bonding curve.

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This seems like proxy voting. I would just give Kleros my voting power that’s it?

So ANJ replaces PNK? Where does the ANT come from which are in the bonding curve to back ANJ?

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I completely agree on this, protocol can only scale with more teams building on them and if they are interoperable with other protocols :slight_smile: .

It’s definitively free to fork, no one is gonna sue you over it. But that would place Aragon in a competitor position and would probably be dealt as such (forking again Aragon to put back the original Kleros and cie).

I understand well that Aragon does not intent to provide general dispute resolution and is not a “real” Kleros competitor. However, communication are not perceived this way (a good evidence was this tweet of today where someone believe the Aragon Court would be usable for their app).

Interesting article.
I would not consider 1) to be ethic (but agree to disagree on that) but would agree on 2) to avoid “decentralized” monopoly rents.
I would find it normal to fork a system charging fees or with a token that is made to capture value but does not fullfull Mike’s cryptosystem manifesto.

Also note that the “not competing with your users” is one of the argument among many, you don’t need to agree to it to agree with the proposal.

Yeah, and that is by working together now that we would accrue high community value compared to competing at this on so little details (and as I said again, Kleros community is really aligned with Aragon core value).

If financial resources were not scarce why not. But you cannot expect small project (in term of funding) to gift part of their token utility to large ones without anything in return.

Interesting, but could you explain how it would provide additional funding compared to selling tokens?

That would be interesting, but it would need to be something atomic (in one proposal), as we cannot afford to gift some part of PNK utility “in hope” that it would be what Aragon network would decide.

I agree, there would definitively need to be some kind of agreement as otherwise Aragon network could just accept the token utility gift and not give anything back.

While more general dispute resolution is not currently the highest priority, I would not rule it out for the Aragon Court in the future… and that particular tweet seems like it would actually be reasonably close to the intended functionality of proposal agreements.

I don’t really see the ethical or moral argument here? While we can agree to disagree on that front, it seems to be a fairly significant point in your argument and it has been brought up quite a bit in the thread.

Perhaps if PNK offered similar economic benefit to ANT holders as the Aragon Court, but I think beyond the overall ideology of Aragon there is still a core value that the Aragon Network and its grants should ultimate accrue in some way to ANT. So while there currently may be ideological alignment, there is not economic alignment (yet).

I think what I’m suggesting is not a “gift” to ANT holders. I think that it is rational for Kleros and PNK holders to consider linking PNK to ANT without any corresponding payment, grant, or promise.

Linking ANT to PNK via a bonding curve doesn’t represent a cost PNK holders. PNK will be diluted by future sales by the Kleros cooperative either way, by choosing to use something like Aragon Fundraising rather than a follow-on IICO, supporters can fund the organizations and release funding over time using the Tap mechanism rather than all at once. Because funds don’t have to be released all at once, investors can opt to exit using the bonding curve, and because investors can exit more effectively you may be able to raise more funds than you would otherwise.

Furthermore, Unlike an IICO/ICO or other one-shot funding model, with Aragon Fundraising if Kleros is successful in driving long-term sustained demand for PNK, there is a built-in mechanism that provides sustainable funding for maintenance and improvements to the Kleros protocol.

Aragon Fundraising supports accepting DAI and ANT (and other tokens) as collateral, using both DAI and ANT is default. You can have the tap connected to DAI, and as funds are released to the organization’s discretionary pool the DAI price will decrease and an arbitrage opportunity will exist on the ANT curve. This will encourage people (through arbitrage) to redeem tokens (eg PNK) for ANT and deposit DAI. The result is that it doesn’t matter how much of the collateral pool is held in DAI versus ANT so long as there is enough total collateral in the curve to support the desired liquidity and tap rate. Holding DAI as collateral is nice because it makes the tap rate more legible, and holding ANT as collateral allows a project to 1) create alignment with the Aragon community with basically zero opportunity cost 2) allows projects to vote in the AGP process and direct resources/priorities to the infrastructure they are using.

FWIW 1Hive (a project I’m involved in) is working on a project that requires a token and is planning on using Aragon Fundraising for exactly the reasons indicated above. We see the link with ANT as a strategic advantage because we plan to be active participants in the Aragon Community and AGP process.

As I explained above, I think that connecting PNK to a bonding curve (rather than doing another IICO) that is at least partially collateralized with ANT is a smart move regardless of whether Aragon gives any grants to Kleros.

I can’t speak for anyone else, but if Kleros aligned themselves and PNK with ANT in this way I would definitely be more supportive of grants related to Kleros development or integration with Aragon, and would be less willing to expend resources on extending the Aragon Courts utility to more general dispute resolution cases in the future.


This tweet is about solving disputes about whether or not someone showed as an event in time. This does not seem to be linked to proposal agreements.

There are a lot of previous posts about it and I don’t think it is healthy for the conversation to keep repeating them and being stuck on that particular point. But if someone wants to open another thread dedicated to the ethics of forking, I’ll be happy to participate.
It has been brought up because it is non consensual, not because it is more significant than others. I guess that other arguments are way more consensual, thus not leading to that much discussion.

Yeah, and that is exactly the point of the proposal, to give an economic alignment such that working together is better economically compared to forking each others.

If you would be willing to do that, why wouldn’t you be willing to commit to it in a proposal?
For now, Kleros team as been speaking with Aragon One, used Aragon and offered collaboration (for more than 2 years). And this lead to Aragon One planning to fork Kleros cryptosystem to put their token instead. So I guess that you can understand that Kleros cannot proceed without any reciprocal agreement.

Can you elaborate on what you mean when you say “Kleros cannot proceed without any reciprocal agreement”?

Luke is suggesting that Kleros would unilateraly allow PNK to be minted through an ANT bonded curve without any agreement with Aragon and that if it would do so, Aragon may integrate Kleros and avoid competing with it, but without promising anything.

I’m saying that to be fair, agreements should include promises of both sides.

I would also be much more inclined to vote yes to a subsequent proposal. my reasoning would be

  1. Kleros has demonstrated it is actually an active participant in the Aragon community, as opposed to a party simply leveraging the platform. As stated towards the beginning of the thread. Kleros has not participated in any AGPs, nor does it own any ANT. Personally id be much more inclined to sacrifice and compromise to an organisation who is part of our community.

I also don’t think Kleros needs to commit their identity to become a valuable part of the Aragon ecosystem and for there to be meaningful collaboration. However there Must be some commitment simply using the Aragon platform for free and not contributing dose not qualify IMO.

for Kleros to be the ONLY court provider means there should be a much higher demonstration of commitment


I think that Kleros needs to raise funds, they could choose to do a follow on IICO or private sale, or they could choose to use Aragon Fundraising (and link PNK with ANT). PNK gets diluted either way, for PNK holders it shouldn’t matter too much which route is taken we are not talking about “additional” dilution, we are talking about alternative approaches to raise funds.

My opinion is that Aragon Fundraising is the better path for Kleros and Kleros supporters without any agreements or extra perks. It provides a continuous and accountable way to raise funds from supporters, and those supporters have more accountability then would be possible with a one-shot private raise or follow on IICO.

I think that as a side effect, going that route eliminates the underlying motivation for competition, with this approach it doesn’t matter to me as an ANT holder whether the Aragon Court or Kleros Court are more successful, so while I can’t really provide any guarantees about how future proposals will go, I can say that there seems to be less risk for Kleros that resources would be allocated to making the Aragon Court more competitive with Kleros Court in the future, and there may be more opportunity for collaboration or specialization.

But again I see these as side effects of creating alignment, not as deal sweeteners–because again I think using Aragon Fundraising and linking PNK to ANT is in and of itself a good strategy for Kleros. Asking to also tack on additional agreements to that feels like asking for compensation to do what is already in your best interest. :man_shrugging:

  • Kleros team has been communicating with Aragon One team for 2 years.
  • Kleros team has proposed to work with Aragon One team.
  • Kleros has stopped his DAO development program.
  • Kleros is using Aragon (and is to the best of my knowledge the second largest Aragon DAO after the ANT one).
  • Kleros team has been giving inputs to liquid voting.
  • Kleros team has been giving voting theory workshops (for free and not related to Kleros) at Aracon.
  • Kleros has been showing values perfectly aligned with the Aragon manifesto.

So I think there has been some commitment.

But all of this lead to the Aragon One team planning to fork the Kleros cryptosystem to put an ANT derivative without any counter proposal.

I’m for further commitments to be made, as long as it goes both ways.

I am only speaking for my self as a community member, not A1 nor any other flock team. I am talking about commitment to the Aragon community. For sure A1 is for now the dominant team within the ecosystem, but A1 is not Aragon. I want to see Kleros active in the community and importantly in its governance.

Despite the difference in opinion, this has been a really good and healthy discussion. I want to see Kleros participate more in the governance process shaping the platform it relies on, not just AGPs that directly effect its competitiveness

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If you mean buying ANT, we don’t have budget for that.
If you mean discussing governance issues not related to Kleros one way or another, we don’t have time for that.
If you means testing Aragon products, giving feedback of what we would like to have as a DAO user, discussing how to solve technical issues. We are already doing it (online here / here or at events here (a footage of myself (I didn’t know I was recorded :p) looking on how to get the median on Aragon votes instead of the mean which is subject to heavy strategic voting).

I understand you don’t have a budget for buying tokens, however, holding ANT aligns kleros economically with Aragon. Lukes suggestion using fundraising instead of IICO makes perfect sense to me and you will acquire ANT without having to purchase it on the open market. Voting is very important and id like to see kleoros to be taking an active part in the process

It’s a shame you feel that way and kind of goes to my point. other flock and nest members regularly engage in the AGP process, scrutinising proposals on how they would benefit the Aragon ecosystem. even if it doesn’t directly affect their project because they see themselves as integral to Aragon. they feel they have ownership over the platform and are of this community. I see this kind of participation as highly valuable to the Aragon ecosystem as the more organisations involved in the community, the more diverse the discourse and decision making.

this is great and I welcome it. I just want to see more actual alignment not just talk of it.

Third Party holding PNK here.

Every single PNK holder knows that they’re meant to be diluted through IICO fundraising rounds at some point, part of the initial deal, not an issue.

I’m in favor of both Aragon & Kleros working together as partners, and as one of the most active juror if there’s a bonding curve out there allowing me to lock PNK to mint ANJ. i’ll use ANJ in hope to get drawn on cases and earn some arbitration fees on their courts.

The funding part is important to me as an investor, during the IICO the only option was ETH. I rather see fundraising in DAI because my incentive is that the team project is funded enough to focus on #BUIDL, i don’t want the project financed spend time and resources in hedging, managing or doing some financial mumbo jumbo with volatile assets.
So raising $ in ANT for Kleros above a symbolic % is a no-go for me.

Being diluted with a PNK/ANJ minting event in DAI (even centralized stablecoins such as USDC or USDT) is something i’ll approve. Raising money in ETH, ANT or whatever bad SoV coins is something i do not want. i know y’all want your token to moon, but let’s secure stable funding first #toTheMoon then.

Locking PNK to mint ANJ (and burn ANJ the other way around to release PNK) is also a good idea.

All the ego-trip discussion are irrelevant for me. just be adults and find a fair, win-win deal
IMHO it’s just cheaper, faster and more efficient to have Kleros ship the feature Aragon wants.

Side-node : this thread is amazing.


The funding dapp Luke refers to is not released and it would not be reasonable to wait that long for further funding (you want to always have treasury in advance to face unforeseen events and not have to take bad deals or sell tokens in bad circonstances).
Moreover there is a convenience (people are less likely to have ANT than ETH/DAI) and liquidity cost (it’s easier to pay people in ETH/DAI compared to having to liquidate ANT positions to pay people) to accept specific tokens compared to widely used ones.
This cost may be low compared to the benefit of collaboration but it should not be paid unilaterally.

Flock and nest members receive funding from Aragon. So they are incentivized to participate in Aragon governance.
It is unreasonable to ask for Kleros to do it unilaterally. As if no agreement are made, Aragon would be a competitor (at least on DAO constitution / proposal agreements), so it would not make sense to dedicate time to the better functioning of a competitor.
If this proposal (or any other fair counter proposal incentivized parties to work together) pass, Kleros would also have a stake in the Aragon network and then it would make sense to pay more attention to Aragon governance.

Yeah and this is the point of this proposal to create collaboration and mutual alignment.

Using ANT and DAI as collateral would not require the project to maintain this treasury allocation, it would be a self balancing mechanism much like set protocol. So while there would be a one time strategic decision to hold some percentage of the reserves in ANT, it would not be an ongoing decision.

From a fundraising perspective there is definitely a strategic decision in allocating a larger percentage of the reserves in ANT versus DAI. With pure DAI you minimized volatility risks associated with ANT(or another volatile asset), but you also give up the upside and alignment. You also are holding the projects reserves in a non-productive asset, whereas with ANT you would be able to use that to participate in the AGP process and influence resource allocation from Aragon’s treasury.

I’m not suggesting that there is not a trade-off space there, just that I think that strategically it makes sense for Kleros/PNK holders to consider and explore that option.

If the primary concern here is simply timing, I’m not sure how different the timeline would actually be relative to this AGP proposal passing and some sort of deal being negotiated…

Users can fund in DAI and never use ANT, the collateral reserve pools are self balancing due to arbitrage. We expect that to be the case in general, most people will typically interact with the DAI curve for both contributing and for managing the tap allocation, and arbitrage bots will interact with the other curve to maintain the proper balance.

I was comparing to funding by further sale because you compared it to further sale.
But yeah, there could be some classic sale first followed a bonded curve funding later one.
When do you plan to release a live version of it?

Yeah, but that means that some part of the funding is lost due to arbitrage. That may not be a high cost, so it can be worth it if there is bilateral collaboration.

Are you currently conducting a further sale? Or are you making this AGP proposal first, and then evaluating options based on the outcome? My assumption is that it is more the later, so I based the timeline comparison on that.

We are currently doing user testing and iteration on Rinkeby, as well as preparing documentation. The mainnet launch will depend somewhat on the user feedback that we get during this stage, but the contract code has been audited already and we are primarily working on improving front-end interactions and flows.

We can do a deeper dive and go over where things are at and how they are working if you are interested. cc @cemfdagdelen @DanielS @osarrouy

The value created by arbitrageurs is dependent on trading activity, it shouldn’t impact the project significantly. It is more a transfer from users who prefer the convenience of one trading pair over another, similar to what happens when a token trades on multiple exchanges with multiple trading pairs.

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