Collateral based/bond proxies design to fix collusion

A common vulnerability within all different DAO’s is the use of uncollateralized proxies.

The problem with this, is that they do not offer a collateral/bond based proxy. DAO’s often introduce proxies as a way to encourage participation because delegators are lazy. But often, these proxies does not have ANY requirement of owning coin collateral and have INFINITE capacity to receive delegation. This creates a misalignment of incentives between delegates and delegators leading to collusion.

The only way to unite incentives between delegates and delegators, is for delegates to be required to put coins in bonds and their voting weight that they can acquire via delegation should be proportional to the amount of coins they put in bonds. IF they put let’s say 10,000 coins in bonds, they’ll be able to receive up to 100,000 coins of total voting weight from delegators, a 1/10 ratio.

This way, delegators now own a skin-in-the-game, and the incentives are now aligned with delegators, collusion is heavily mitigated this way, also centralization of voting is heavily mitigated, since now delegates they have a maximum delegation capacity.

Does Aragon have found a way to design proxies this way?

Uncollateralized proxies are basically entities that does NOT own any single property and are high hacking the rich list alongside with genuine rich people that actually bought their coins from the markets. They are a threat to the DAO.

Genuine rich people have the best intentions to vote rationally and objectively since they own a skin in the game. Uncollateralized proxies does not risk anything for making irrational decisions, and they are a nest for collusion.

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