Boost security with NFT voting shares

Tellor a decentralized oracle network recently published a new whitepaper of their upcoming tellorx network. There they presented how they will boost their security through NFT voting shares. I think this can be done for Aragon too. In short stakeholders get NFT voting shares proportional to the TRB they earn/spent in the network. They can’t transfer the voting shares only by giving away their private key. I can imagine in Aragon that guardians can level up and earn voting shares also DAOs which uses Aragon govern receive voting shares.

From the whitepaper

In previous versions of Tellor each vote was weighted by the amount of TRB tokens held at the time a dispute or an update was proposed. As the Tellor community continues to grow, there is a need to balance the voting power among stakeholders: holders, reporters, and users. TRB stakeholders all want Tellor to continue to grow, but the approach and needs of each group can be different. Weighting their votes differently can provide some checks and balances when considering the benefits of various proposals. For Tellor X, there are three groups of stakeholders identified in the Tellor system:
• Reporters
• TRB holders
• Users
TRB holder weights are measured as the balance of TRB on the chain where the vote is taking place. For reporters, each submitted data point affords them additional non-transferable voting power weighted at 1TRB per successful submission. However, reporters must be actively bonded to be able to vote with their allocated non-transferable voting power. Users are weighted by the number of tips they have paid into the system at a .5 rate. As an example, if a user tips 2 TRB, they are afforded 1 TRB worth of voting power in the system.

In a system with reporter and tipper votes, the attack vectors are different. The total number of mining votes in the system is the count of all historical mining events among actively bonded reporters. At a rate of one mining event per minute (a very fast chain), this would indicate 525,000 mining votes given each year. With a current supply of around 2M TRB and about 1/10 that many mining events, this makes even a bestcase scenario for the attacker prohibitively expensive to carry out in any manner that is not a multi-year attack. Since other chains are faster and cheaper than Ethereum, this governance parameter would need to be carefully considered when deploying to other chains.

To break the system via tipping, the cost would be higher than if just using the token weighted option(holder)… If you buy the token and tip, you get half a vote. The malicious attacker could recycle the tips so as not to drain liquidity and increase the price (easier to buy in smaller lots and tip versus actually buying 51% of the total supply), additionally, due to the fact that half of the tips are burned, the reduction in total supply would drastically increase the token price, making each additional tip more expensive.