Although instead of rewarding a proposal, I’d rather do the opposite. I’d ask the user to stake like 10 ANT, in case of success the amount is returned plus any amount that gets pooled from users that would lose their stake for proposals that aren’t accepted?
Important to mention that AGP editors are filtering out proposals and it’s perfectly legitimate if it gets refused at this stage. In order to win 1k ANT, the proposal has to pass both the AGP editors as well as be approved by ANT holders.
@lkngtn was it what you had in mind when you mentioned fleshing things out a bit on this?
The requirement to stake ANT in order to submit a proposal would require a meta-track AGP, So I would recommend following the current process for submitting a meta track AGP. This video sort of explains how to create an agp and what the different tracks are: How to create an Aragon Governance Proposal
The initial draft doesn’t need to be complete, in fact the earlier it gets in there the better as it provides a concrete place to discuss iterate on the details in a structured way.
That being said, it’s not quite what I had in mind. I think this approach is interesting, it reminds me a bit of https://kickback.events. The main issue is that I think the the staking requirement and settlement process ends up requiring a technical implementation to be done which makes it a bit more difficult to support due to the complexity and resources required to actually implement the process. I think it’s always better if we can validate an idea/concept without committing significant resources to implementation when possible.
In that vein, I would suggest a lighter approach that I think would accomplish a similar goal of incentivizing high quality proposal submission.
Submit a finance track AGP proposing a pool of funds be allocated to reward the submitter/author of an AGP which passes.
The proposal should specify who custodies and is responsible for distributing these funds (is it an organization like the Cooperative, or just the Association)
The proposal should specify if there is a set amount of funds per proposal, or a set amount of funds per quarterly vote (which would then be split among all passing proposals).
This can be a finance proposal (which is simpler and requires less support) as opposed to a meta-track proposal because it doesn’t fundamentally change the actual voting procedure.
I think having participants put up a deposit is likely to significant increase the quality of proposals and act like a spam filter, so I am very much interested in the initial proposal… But at this point we do not really have an issue with spammy proposals, so it seems like we might get some initial benefit (and test the idea of whether a financial incentive would significant increase the volume of quality proposals) by simply providing a reward for passed proposal but without a punishment for failed proposals.