Thanks for the proposal, I find the use of Dot vote very interesting and potentially a good solution to arbitrate cases where the budget is exceeded.
However I must share with you my concern about a crucial detail: the dot vote concerning the entirety of the budget.
This would lead to catastrophic perverse effects:
- it would potentially turn every ANV into a zero-sum political fight for funding. The ROI on shipping versus “propaganda” would be vastly reduced for teams, leading an already exhausting funding process to become increasingly so. I don’t think anybody wants 80% of their time to be spent on politics.
- for small teams a delta of decimals in the dot vote would lead to no project or funding multiple times the amount necessary to deliver on their proposal. Not funding voted projects or overfunding them seems like a very inefficient means of capital allocation.
- not only would teams have no time visibility as the dot votes could happen every quarter but the visibility on the amount itself would be nul. This creates issues in building a proposal but more importantly in hiring talent. To build a world class product the network needs to be composed of world class talent, with such a system I don’t see a way to attract such individuals.
So that’s for the bad, but I do see some reedeming qualities if applied well.
For example if the sum of passed proposals is 120% over-budget all passed proposals would be cut proportionally to attain 80% total budget. The remaining 20% would then be allocated via a dot vote. This would allow more capital to accrue to the most prioritised items. If the minimum amount+dot vote amount would not be satisfactory to a proposer they could always withdrawing leaving a surplus to the treasury.
And it would be an amount small enough not to cause those dot votes becoming life and death for teams so they can focus on drafting sensible proposals.
As the base rate of cutting funding pre-dot vote would be uniform it would encourage cross-team collective bargaining to try to fit all proposals into the budget. This makes negotiation a collaborative process rather a public political struggle pitting all against all.
In conclusion this mechanism could be very useful for arbitrating the edge cases of budget overflows in a fair manner, but it should not be used for anywhere near 100% of the budget allocation.
EDIT: There’s an obvious attack that leads teams to propose higher and higher budgets to get a higher base rate. The question of how to allocate budgets in these situations is crucial and some solutions such as https://colony.io/budgetbox.pdf are very inspiring, could be cool to see if there’s any cross-DAO collaboration possible