A space for the Aragon Association to notify the network of any official funds transfers to the AN DAO
The following proposals and discussion - May June 2022 - relate to Transfer of Funds from the AA to the AN DAO
The proposal below is put forward by Placeholder , an early investor in Aragon and one of the largest holders of ANT. An earlier version of the proposal is available here .
The associated vote is live on Aragon Voice from June 3, 2022 to June 17, 2022.
Proposal Summary
Limit the foundational document of the Aragon Network DAO (AN DAO) to a mission statement, description of the core governance structure/process, and community guidelines.
Set aside funds for the Aragon Association (AA) and Arag…
Greetings Aragon community,
Since this is my first post, I will introduce myself: I am a diplomat of 15 years of experience with extensive focus in the last decade on governance and power sharing arrangements between states and constituent states in federal arrangements. I have done my fair share of reading and learning about the current state of play in governance in DAO’s, however my “on the ground” experience, especially in the Aragon ecosystem, is limited. As such, in response to the Projec…
The recent proposal to implement a delegative ANT voting system to control the Aragon treasury and the ANT token contract includes a reference to a Delegate Code of Conduct - a list of principles and guidelines that delegates would be expected to commit and adhere to. An initial draft of a possible Delegate Code of Conduct, inspired by a similar document of MakerDAO, is presented below. Feedback/suggestions welcome, keeping in mind that the Code of Conduct should be as short and unambiguous as p…
Over the previous weeks, there have been many discussion on purpose and edits to the purpose statements in the DAO, and I know the AN DAO community have just begun these discussions and thought we would bring out some improvements so far to carry on the conversation in the forum.
We are proposing a community vote to align on the purpose of the AN DAO. This will play an essential role in facilitating the transfer of funds from AA to AN DAO (as proposed here ).
The Aragon manifesto is loved by ma…
Over the past few months, we have seen a few initiatives applying for funding or already being funded to provide services to the Aragon Network. This is specifically relevant for those teams/groups that will be focused on synthesizing the representation of the entire network, namely:
Umbrell proposal (the Culture element)
Decentralised governance proposal (the MVV element)
Health analytics proposal (the stakeholder list below is relevant to ensure interviews and metrics capture every group …
Dear Aragon community,
Soon we will be called to vote on critical decisions regarding the purpose, structure and direction of Aragon. I am supportive of the efforts being made to unify and transition the Aragon teams into a DAO and wanted to share some thoughts for discussion.
The Aragon Manifesto has always been my driving force. Its values are core to the work I continue today with Nation3 , building tools to increase freedom. The Aragon values and manifesto unite us and continue to drive the…
Dear Aragon Community
In my function as an external accountant and tax advisor of Aragon Association (“AA”) and Aragon Labs (“AL”), I would like to draw the Community’s attention to certain tax implications if the funds of Aragon Association are transferred to the Network DAO.
Tax implications:
AA is subject to Swiss laws on taxes, VAT, and social insurances and has to fulfil its current legal and tax obligations in Switzerland.
Currently, the AA has a very favourable tax ruling in place wit…
Anyone who thinks the decision should be postponed (incl. because further discussion is required), should vote Abstain. Since different people may have different reasons for choosing Abstain, I would recommend against specifying this option any further. In my opinion, it should be open for anyone who doesn’t support the other choices, whatever their reasoning.
The following response represents the views of the core team members of the Aragon Association and Aragon Labs:
The Aragon Association and Aragon Labs (to be referred to as the “core teams”) were blindsided by recent amendments to the Proposal: Transfer the Aragon Project Funds to an Aragon DAO Governed by (Delegated) ANT , specifically reducing the core teams’ runway to “continue existing operations up until November 30, 2022”. This amendment has consequences on the core teams’ ability to conti…
@Zeptimus has kindly provided forum posts to help inform our ability to use the commons Config (Aragon version) to inform our understanding of the delegate-enabled Tao Voting DAO. These documents are intended to support the communities ability to experiment with the voting parameters as they apply to the Tao Voting demo approved here
What is the Support Required (%)?
The Support Required (%) is the percentage of YES votes from the vote-total required for a proposal to pass.
Implications & Parameter Options
The Support Required (%) is measured as a percentage (YES Votes/Total Votes), and you will have the option to set this parameter between 50 and 100.
The Support Required is an important consideration when developing responsible voting configurations. We desire consensus when voting, and the Support Required percentage …
What is the Minimum Quorum (%)?
The Minimum Quorum (%) is the percentage of all tokens from the total supply of ANT that must vote on a proposal in order for it to be valid.
Implications & Parameter Options
The Minimum Quorum (%) is measured as a percentage (YES Votes/ANT Supply), and you will have the option to set this parameter between 0% and 100%.
The Minimum Quorum percentage sets a baseline of support by token holders that is required for a proposal to pass. This parameter ensures that…
What is Vote Duration?
This is the voting duration (usually in days) of a proposal in Tao Voting. During this time ANT holders are allowed to vote on the proposal, users cannot take back their vote and users are only allowed to vote ONCE.
Vote Duration in Disputable Voting has other voting period sections that exist within it: Quiet Ending Period and Delegated Voting Period. The Quiet Ending Extension, if triggered, will increase the Vote Duration by the duration of the QEE, however many times…
Delegated Voting
One of the unique mechanics in Disputable Voting is the ability for ANT holders to vest their voting powers to another DAO member, this DAO member thus becoming a ‘Delegate’. Delegates will be able to use their vested voting power to cast votes on behalf of their Delegator.
Delegators are able to veto their portion of a Delegates vote once it’s cast in the event that a Delegate votes contrary to the Delegator’s preference. Delegates, same as all other voters can only vote ONCE…
Quiet Ending
One of the unique features of Disputable Voting is Quiet Ending. This checks for flipped outcomes during the final portion of the Vote Duration and adds more voting time in the event of a flip.
What is Quiet Ending Period?
This a the specified amount of time within the latter part of the Vote Duration. During the Quiet Ending Period if the voting outcomes changes from “yes” to “no” or vice versa it will trigger the Quiet Ending Extension. The Quiet Ending Period can only happen o…
What is the Execution Delay?
The Execution Delay describes the required amount of time after a proposal passes for the proposal to be executed.
Implications & Parameter Options
The Execution Delay is measured in hours, and you will have the option to set this parameter between 0 and ∞.
The Execution delay is important because we want to give token holders enough time to evaluate the implications of a proposal. They might need to decide whether or not they want to maintain their token holding…
Proposal Deposit
With Tao Voting , proposal creators must lock a set amount of funds as the collateral required to create a proposal. This amount of funds is the parameter “Proposal Deposit” and is set during the design phase. These funds are returned to the proposal creator when the proposal passes or fails.
Design Considerations
A higher Proposal Deposit creates more friction for proposal creators, therefore increasing the likelihood of more “serious” proposals, but making proposal creation …
The Settlement Period parameter is set during the design phase, and affects Disputable Voting .
Essentially, if an individual believes that a certain proposal is malicious, contains an error, or is not in alignment with the Community Covenant, they can challenge the proposal .
Once challenged, the proposal creator has a set amount of time, the “Settlement Period” to dispute the challenge by paying dispute fees and raising the issue to court, or to resolve the challenge by paying the Settlement O…
Discord Q & A thread here
